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As concern over the numerous cases of fraud, waste, abuse,
and mismanagement of programs has grown, new legal amendments,
directives and standards have been developed to strengthen
internal control systems in the Federal Government as a prevent-
ive measure. There is a critical need for "... Senior executive
Service, Merit Pay, senior military equivalents and other
civilian and military employees with significant management
responsibilities ..." [Ref. 1] to gain a knowledge and under-
standing of the concept of internal control and their respon-
sibilities in this area in order to guide the implementation
of effective systems within their organization. The purpose
of this thesis is to provide the requisite knowledge and
understanding for these Department of Defense (DOD) managers.
B. BACKGROUND
Despite the fact that internal controls have not been a
major management priority, the recognition of their importance
in the Federal Government is not new. The Accounting and
Auditing Act of 1950 placed the responsibility for establish-
ing and maintaining adequate systems of internal control upon
the head of each executive agency. The Act encompassed not
only systems of internal control that provide full disclosure
of an agency's financial results, adequate financial

information for agency management purposes, reliable accounting
results and suitable integration of agency accounting with
Treasury Department accounting, but also systems of internal
control that provide effective control over the account-
ability of all funds, property, and other assets for which
the agency is responsible. Thus, as early as 1950, the law
clearly indicated that proper systems of accounting and in-
ternal control were necessary for program and operational
activities, as well as for financial and administrative
functions
.
Even so, the development of effective systems has been
slow. Recent public disclosures of fraud, waste, and abuse,
and findings of poor internal controls such as those noted in
a study by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) have caused
concern among responsible federal officials and taxpayers:
... the loss to the Government on the 77,000 cases would
total between $150 and $220 million. These losses are
only what is attributable to known fraud and other
illegal activities investigated by the Federal agencies
in this study. It does not include . . . the cost of
undetected fraud which is probably much higher because
weak internal controls allow fraud to flourish . . . the
cost of fraud and illegal activities cannot always be
measured in dollars and cents. Fraud erodes public
confidence in the Government's ability to efficiently
and effectively manage its programs. [Ref . 2]
Within the last several years increased attention has been
directed toward strengthening internal controls to prevent
illegal, unauthorized, or questionable actions, to help restore
confidence in Government, and to improve its operations.
These, and other developments, will be reviewed.

C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
This thesis will provide a review and evaluation of the
internal control program in the Department of the Navy.
The evolution of the term internal control will be put
into perspective by presenting the development within the
private sector and then comparing it to the evolution of the
expression in the public sector.
The theoretical background of R. N. Anthony's Planning and
Control System and his management control process will be
reviewed in order to provide a general structure within which
to integrate the specific systems of internal control of the
private and public sectors.
Managers in both sectors share the common concerns of
obtaining and utilizing resources effectively and efficiently
in accomplishing the objectives of their organizations. Yet
the definitive literature concerning the subject of establish-
ing and reviewing internal controls provides assistance to
independent auditors in their review of financial controls
and does not address the spectrum of administrative/ as well
as, accounting controls necessary to meet managers'
requirements. As an assistance, a more comprehensive method-
ology for establishing an internal control system which
emphasizes program and operational controls, as well as




The internal accounting controls of the private sector
will be integrated within Anthony's management control frame-
work, as will DOD's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System.
A number of illustrative cases will demonstrate the
inadequacy of focusing on the narrow interpretation of internal
accounting control when the real intent is management control.
Finally, the conclusion is reached that management
control—measures employed by management to reach its
objectives--is the only meaningful framework within which the
subsets of administrative and accounting controls must be
combined for the effective and efficient accomplishment of
the organizations' objectives, whether of the public or
private sector.
The research consisted primarily of a detailed search and




II. EVOLUTION OF THE TERM INTERNAL CONTROL
A. INTRODUCTION
The following chapters will compare the development of
the concept of internal control in the private sector with
the evolution in the public arena. Topics to be considered
are: definitional concerns, the establishment of a system of
internal control and its purpose, the process of internal
control reviews, and finally, a conceptualization of the
concept from a management perspective.
B. EVOLUTION OF DEFINITION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
A major concern with internal control in the private
sector arises from the function of the independent audit —
the independent investigation of a business firm's financial
statements by Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) . In this
context, management of the business firm is responsible for
adopting sound accounting policies, accounting procedures,
and the presentation of financial data. The independent auditor
or CPA, based on his or her review of evidence relating to
the reliability of financial data and the safeguarding of
assets and records, provides an independent opinion on the
fairness of management's presentation of financial data as
a basis for third party reliance.
Since the volume of transactions within most commercial
firms precludes review of each and every economic event, one
12

of the ten Generally Accepted Auditing Standards states:
There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the exist-
ing internal control as a basis for reliance thereon and
for the determination of the resultant extent of the
tests to which auditing procedures are to be restricted.
[Ref. 3]
Utilizing this professional standard established by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in
the late 1940 's, the auditor can effectively limit the amount
of audit evidence accumulated, if he believes that the client
has a system of internal control which provides reliable
financial information and protects assets and records. If he
determines any of the internal controls are inadequate, he
cannot rely on them and must seek a greater quantity of
evidence.
Note that this audit standard, as well as the other nine,
is broad and does not provide a detailed methodology for
accomplishment. It is meant to serve as a guide to the
selection of the proper procedures based on the individual
auditor's judgment of the pertinent methods appropriate to a
situation. In fact, judgment is heavily emphasized in the
application of audit standards.
The definition of the term internal control has varied in
the private sector since the 1930s.
In 19 49 the Committee on Auditing Procedures (CAP) of the
AICPA formally defined the term as:
Internal control comprises the plan of organization and
all of the coordinate methods and measures adopted within
a business to safeguard its assets, check the accuracy
13

and reliability of its accounting data, promote opera-
tional efficiency, and encourage adherence to prescribed
managerial policies. [Ref. 4]
This definition is broader than the meaning presently at-
tributed to the term by practicing auditors. By the inclusion
of the phrase " ... promote operational efficiency and
encourage adherence to prescribed managerial policies," this
statement recognizes that a system of internal control extends
beyond those matters which are directly of an accounting or
financial nature.
Such a system might include budgeting control, standard
costs, periodic operating reports, statistical analysis ...
a training program ... to aid personnel in meeting their
responsibilities, and an internal audit staff to provide
additional assurance to management as to the adequacy
of its outlined procedures and the extent to which they
are being carried out. It properly comprehends activities
in other fields (such as) time and motion studies . . . and
use of quality controls. [Ref. 5]
Such a definition was perceived as too expansive for
Certified Public Accountants* purposes, so the accounting
profession subdivided the term into accounting controls and
administrative controls in an effort to narrow the auditor's
review as it pertains to his examination leading to the ex-
pression of an opinion on financial statements. In response
to critics of the above definition of internal control, CAP
modified the definition in 1958 as follows:
Internal control , in the broad sense includes: control
which may be characterized as either accounting or
administrative as follows:
Accounting controls comprise the plan of organization and
all the methods and procedures that are concerned mainly
with, and relate directly to the safeguarding of assets
and the reliability of the financial records. They
14

generally include such controls as the systems of authoriza-
tion and approval, separation of duties concerned with
record keeping and accounting reports from those concerned
with operations or asset custody, physical controls over
assets and internal auditing.
Administrative controls comprise the plan of organization
and all the methods and procedures that are concerned
mainly with operational efficiency and adherence to
managerial policies and usually relate only indirectly
to the financial records. They generally include such
controls as statistical analysis, time and motion studies,
performance reports, employee training programs, and
quality controls. [Ref. 6]
In 1963 CAP further narrowed the independent auditor's
responsibility for evaluating internal control:
The independent auditor is primarily concerned with the
accounting controls. Accounting controls ... generally
bear directly and importantly on the reliability of
financial records and require evaluation by the auditor.
Administrative controls . . . ordinarily relate only
indirectly to the financial records and thus would not
require evaluation. [Ref. 7]
Not everyone agreed with this limitation of the concept
which served to narrow the scope of the independent CPA's
review. In 1957 Paul Grady, chairman of CAP when the original
broad definition was issued, commented on the controversy:
The suggested narrowing of viewpoint, in my opinion, would
constitute serious retrogression and impair the founda-
tion of independent auditing. It may sound paradoxical,
but there are many endeavors wherein a broader concept of
responsibility results in a lesser risk. In the present
international situation the recently announced Middle
East Policy obviously broadens our responsibility. We
have undertaken it, however, in order to lessen the risk
of war. Similarly, the broader view of investigation and
evaluation of internal control lessens the business risk
inherent in the work of the independent auditor. [Ref. 8]
Despite this warning, the auditing profession proceeded
to practice the narrower concept. As time passed, the
15

independent auditor's evaluation of management's policies
was found lacking in a number of legal cases. These legal
proceedings applied the internal control concept as estab-
lished in the inclusive 1949 framework when evaluating the
auditor's actions.
Because of difficulties in interpretation, CAP felt that
clarification of the two types of internal control was
desirable. In 1972, the revised statements were promulgated
as follows:
Administrative control includes, but is not limited to
the plan of organization and the procedures and records
that are concerned with the decision processes leading
to management's authorization of transactions. Such
authorization is a management function directly asso-
ciated with the responsibility for achieving the
objectives of the organization and is the starting point
for establishing accounting control of transactions.
Accounting control comprises the plan of organization and
the procedures and records that are concerned with the
safeguarding of assets and the reliability of financial
records and consequently are designed to provide reason-
able assurance that:
- Transactions are executed in accordance with manage-
ment's general or specific authorization.
- Transactions are recorded as necessary (1) to permit
preparation of financial statements in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles or any
other criteria applicable to such statements and (2)
to maintain accountability for assets.
- Access to assets is permitted only in accordance with
management's authorization.
- The recorded accountability for assets is compared
with the existing assets at reasonable intervals




The committee emphasized that accounting, not administra-
tive, control was to be the focus of audits.
Ignoring the court's interpretation of internal control
in legal actions and the SEC disciplinary proceedings against
auditors, in 1975, Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS)
No. 9 explicitly narrowed the traditional reference to an
evaluation of internal control to read "... evaluation of
internal accounting control." This clearly separates internal
control into that of a "financial" nature versus "management"
control.
During this period of the mid-1970' s the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) censured several of the large audit-
ing firms for lack of independence and certification of false
financial statements and inadequate audit procedures. As a
result, the public began to question the reliability of
corporate financial statements and the role of the independent
auditor. The AICPA requested that the Commission on Auditor's
Responsibilities develop conclusions and recommendations
regarding the appropriate responsibilities of independent
auditors. This commission included a number of prominent
non-accountants. Findings included the following:
The Commission observed that financial reporting has
become a continuous process rather than an annual event.
Much of the information is therefore, unaudited ...
More importantly users are implicitly relying on an
adequate system of internal controls. Internal controls
assure that unaudited information released by corporations
is materially accurate. The Commission observed the
societal concern over illegal and questionable corporate
17

payments and the attention focused on corporate account-
ability and the importance of controls over the accounting
system. The Commission noted that the adequacy of internal
controls is an important investment criterion to creditors
and shareholders. The Commission ... recommended that
the auditors expand their study to review and test the
entire accounting control system . . . greater involvement
of the auditor in the corporate reporting system and a
change in the auditor's focus ... to the examination of
a function. [Ref. 10]
Before the Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities issued
its final report, the Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA
issued SAS No. 20 in December 1977. This statement required
auditors to inform management of material weaknesses in
internal accounting control but it also continued to limit
the scope of the auditor's review:
"... there is no requirement under generally accepted
auditing standards to evaluate each control ..." [Ref. 11]
The independent auditor is only expected to test the controls
upon which he intends to rely.
During this same time period, the media reported on several
cases of falsified corporate records and maintenance of off-
the-books slush funds.
As a result, Congress passed, and President Carter signed,
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977. Bribes or
payments to foreign officials and others to obtain or retain
business were indeed prohibited by this legislation but the
important provisions required all publicly held companies to
establish and maintain adequate systems of internal account-
ing control defined as:
18

... a system of internal accounting controls sufficient
to provide reasonable assurance that:
- transactions are executed in accordance with management's
general or specific authorization
- transactions are recorded as necessary to permit prepara-
tion of financial statements in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles or any other criteria
applicable to such statements, and to maintain account-
ability for assets
- access to assets is permitted only in accordance with
management's general or specific authorization
- the recorded accountability for assets is compared with
the existing assets at reasonable intervals and approp-
riate action is taken with respect to any differences.
Note that these points are directly derived from the profes-
sional auditing literature, namely CAP ' s 1972 clarification
of the types of internal control.
In its interpretation of the internal accounting control
provisions of the FCPA, the American Bar Association warned:
... Foreign bribery is a relatively rare event, but
maintenance of financial records and internal accounting
controls are major everyday activities of every registered
or reporting company . . . (this may be) the most extensive
application of federal law in internal corporate affairs
since the passage of the 1933 and 1934 (security) Acts
. . . (others) foresee at least the possibility that the
new statute will create extensive new liabilities for
corporate managements, auditors, and corporate counsel.
[Ref. 12]
The AICPA appointed the Special Advisory Committee on
Internal Accounting Control to provide guidance to management
in reviewing and implementing internal controls. The forward
to the Committee's report states that the broad guidance in
the professional literature had been developed for the limited
purpose of the auditing profession and noted the need to
provide guidance helpful to management.
19

The Committee declared that management should be concerned
with all of its internal accounting controls and cited the
following broad definition from SAS No. 1 for management's
purposes:
The foregoing definitions (of .internal accounting control
and administrative control) are not necessarily mutually
exclusive because some of the procedures' and records
comprehended in accounting control may also be involved in
administrative control ... For practical purposes, this is
tantamount to including within the definition of accounting
controls any administrative controls that have an important
bearing on the reliability of the financial statements.
Thus the statement underlines the fact that as far as
managers are concerned administrative and accounting controls
are interrelated and both types reinforce management controls
measures employed to obtain the organization's objectives.
This discussion was not meant as a historical review of
actions in the private sector but rather was an attempt to
illustrate the development of the concept of internal control
in the private sector from a broad expansive term, to a
narrow limited focus for the benefit of the auditing profes-
sion and a final recognition by that same profession that
management's concerns are broader and that therefore the
controls contemplated in the 1949 definition are more
appropriate for them.
C. EVOLUTION OF DEFINITION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
As part of Reform 88, the Reagan Administration is com-
mitted to streamlining the management and administration of
the federal government. This initiative includes reducing
20

fraud, improving management controls and eliminating errors
in the administration of government programs.
In October 1981, the Office of Management & Budget (OMB)
issued Circular A-123 on internal control systems as an early
effort to improve these systems. The circular defined require-
ments and responsibilities in order to transform the 1950
Act's expectations into reality. It prescribed policies and
standards for executive agencies in establishing and maintain-
ing internal controls in their program and administrative
functions.
At that time OMB defined Internal Control (as)
:
the plan of organization and all of the methods and measures
adopted within an agency to safeguard its resources, assure
the accuracy and reliability of its information, assure
adherence to applicable laws, regulations and policies,
and promote operational economy and efficiency. [Ref. 13]
This definition is very similar to the 1949 AICPA broad
concept of internal control in that it includes:
OMB Circular 1949 Definition
the safeguarding of resources - safeguarding assets
assuring the accuracy and re- - check the accuracy and
liability of its information reliability of its
accounting data
assuring adherence to applica- - encourage adherence to
ble laws, regulations and prescribed managerial
policies policies
promote operational economy - promote operational
and efficiency efficiency
In fact, based on the parallel construction above, this
definition is even more general than the original private
21

sector statement. In this format, it has served as the basis
for much of the guidance promulgated to executive federal
agencies.
However, in August 1983, OMB issued a revised Circular
A-123 which redefined Internal Control (as)
:
the plan of organization and methods and procedures adopted
by management to provide reasonable assurance that obliga-
tions and costs are in compliance with applicable law; funds,
property and other assets are safeguarded against waste,
loss, unauthorized use, or misappropriation; and revenues
and expenditures applicable to agency operations are properly
recorded and accounted for to permit the preparation of
accounts and reliable financial and statistical reports
and to maintain accountability over the assets. [Ref. 14]
Note that this focus is narrower and related closely to the
auditing profession's 1958 delineation of accounting controls.
All references to the administrative controls, those of ad-
herence to applicable laws, regulations, and policies and the
promotion of operational economy and efficiency have been
dropped.
The Department of Defense (DOD) promulgated OMB's original
Circular A-123 by issuing DOD Directive 7040.6, Internal Control
Systems
,
24 March 1982. This document established DOD ' s pro-
gram of internal control, assigned responsibilities and
provided procedures to ensure that DOD resources are efficiently
and effectively managed. It also appropriated OMB's original
broad definition of internal control.
A policy statement of the directive served to support the
broad formulation of the term:
22

Internal controls are management's responsibility and
should be in effect across the board in every organiza-
tion within each DOD component. Adequate internal
control is required to assure that all resources are
efficiently and effectively managed and is the basic
foundation for integrity in any management system.
Although internal controls in themselves cannot prevent
every incident of waste, mismanagement and fraud, DOD
policy is to ensure that resources are properly managed
and controlled within the Department of Defense. [Ref. 15]
A revision of DOD ' s directive is currently in draft form
and a review of it indicates that DOD has adopted OMB '
s
revised definition of internal control but has chosen to
title it Management Control . It is interesting to note that
a number of other definitions within the revision emphasize
the "management" control aspect yet use the same meanings
OMB has ascribed to internal control with an accounting focus,
i.e., management control review, management control system.
The revised paper still retains the original DOD policy
statement concerning management's responsibility in relation
to internal controls.
In September 19 82, Congress passed the Federal Managers'
Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) , an amendment to the pre-
viously mentioned Accounting and Auditing Act of 19 50 which
placed the cognizance for the effectiveness of financial
management systems in preventing fraud, waste, and abuse upon
federal managers.
One provision of the FMFIA requires that:
Internal accounting and administrative controls . . . shall
provide reasonable assurances that obligations and costs
are in compliance with applicable law; funds, property
23

and other assets are safeguarded against waste, loss,
unauthorized use, or misappropriation; and revenues and
expenditures applicable to agency operations are properly
recorded and accounted for. [Ref. 16]
The revised definitions of internal control issued by OMB
and DOD are certainly better aligned with the objectives of
this provision which does not mention program results or
operational economy and efficiency.
Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST 5200.35),
Internal Control in the Department of the Navy , was issued on
29 July 1983. It implemented the original versions of OMB '
s
Circular and the DOD Directive, as well as the FMFIA, within
the DON and established the Navy's own program to develop,
maintain, review and improve internal control systems to en-
sure resources are efficiently and effectively managed.
Since DON's instruction is based on the first publications
of OMB and DOD, one would expect that the Navy's definition
would support the broader connotation of internal control and
it does:
. . . the plan of organization and all of the methods and
measures adopted within the DON to:
Safeguard resources and assure the accuracy and
reliability of information taccounting controls)
Assure adherence to applicable laws, regulations,
and policies and promote operational economy and
efficiency (administrative controls.
Internal controls are management controls and apply to




Other statements within this instruction also stress the
management aspects of internal controls:
. . . implementing and carrying out an internal control
program is a management responsibility.
Vulnerability assessment. A management evaluation . .
.
Management control review . . . reviews performed by
managers responsible for the program/function under
review ... [Ref. 18]
It is most likely that DON will revise its recent instruc-
tion to better coordinate with the latest guidance from OMB
and DOD.
D. CONCLUSION
By now it should be clear that there are a number of
similarities in the evolution of the definition of internal
control within the private and public sectors. Both have
long recognized the importance of adequate systems of control,
Both sectors began with a broad definition of internal con-
trol and each has moved to a more limited view. Much impetus
for current interest in this subject has developed because of
recent legislation to correct failings in operations: the
FCPA in the private sector and the FMFIA in the public sector
There is little guidance in either sector on specifics; broad
direction is all that is provided.
In the private sector, the major portion of the profes-
sional literature has been directed toward the purposes of
the independent auditor who uses his own evaluation of
management's system as a basis to limit the scope of his
audit tests in financially related areas.
25

The public sector has taken the literature originated
for these narrow purposes and tried to superimpose it on
systems of internal control where a non-independent management
has responsibility for its stewardship of all resources.
It is unclear that the approach advocated by the auditing
profession and the AICPA is necessarily correct for either
public or private sector management. The inclusive interpre-
tation as defined in 1948 can provide administrative, as well
as accounting data — all information management is responsible
for. Thus, as Grady stated in 1957, "a broader concept of
responsibility results in a lesser risk."
26

III. SYSTEMS OF INTERNAL CONTROL
A. INTRODUCTION
Management is responsible for establishing and maintaining
its system of internal controls in order to provide reliable
data, safeguard assets and records, and promote operational
efficiency. The pioneer literature in this area of management
planning and control systems was published in the 1960's by
R. N. Anthony. A discussion of his framework will be presented
in this section, as well as descriptions of internal control
systems within the private and public domains.
B. ANTHONY'S MANAGEMENT CONTROL FRAMEWORK
1. Planning and Controlling Processes
In his book, Planning and Control Systems; A Framework
for Analysis , Anthony presented his concept of systems designed
to facilitate planning and control processes within organiza-
tions, whether profit or nonprofit.
Within the framework of deciding what to do and how to
do it (planning) and assuring results are attained (controlling)
,
three main categories of internal activities carried on in an
organization at different times, by different people, or for
different situations can be delineated, Figure 1.
Strategic planning is defined as the process of
deciding on objectives of the organization, on changes in
these objectives, on the resources used to attain these
27

EXAMPLES OF ACTIVITIES IN A BUSINESS ORGANIZATION INCLUDED IN
MAJOR FRAMEWORK HEADINGS
* **
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objectives, and on the policies that are to govern the
acquisition, use and disposition of these resources.
"Strategy" is used in its usual sense of combining and
employing resources. It connotes big, important plans with
major consequences. "Objectives" are what the total organiza-
tion wishes to accomplish and "policies" are guidelines to be
used in the choice of the most appropriate course of action
for accomplishing the objectives.
Another type of planning is concerned with the con-
tinuing administration of the organization and is closely
associated with control activities. This is management
control , the process by which managers assure that resources
are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the ac-
complishment of the organization's goals. Three important
ideas are conveyed by this statement: the process involves
managers, people who get things done by working with others;
the process occurs within a context of objectives and policies
that have been arrived at in the strategic planning process;
the criteria for judging the actions in this process are
effectiveness and efficiency. This is the root of the term as
used in the DOD and DON documents mentioned in the previous
chapter.
Since the line dividing strategic planning from manage-
ment control is blurred as one process interacts and shades
into the other, figure 2 attempts to delineate significant
distinctions between the two processes.
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The third element is based on the distinction between
the activities referred to as management and activities that
relate to the performance of specific tasks.
Operational control is the process of assuring that
specific tasks are carried out effectively and efficiently.
Distinguishing characteristics between operational
control and management control are that operational control
focuses on specific tasks or transactions, whereas management
control focuses on the flowing stream of continuing operations;
operational control is essentially objective in the sense that
it has to do primarily with activities for which the correct
decisions can be objectively determined. At least concept-
ually, and often practically, a valid decision rule can be
stated mathematically and programmed into a computer. Manage-
ment control is essentially subjective in that decisions in
this process inherently involve management judgment and there
is no objective or "scientific" way of determining the best
course of action in a situation.
As with the distinction between strategic planning and
management control, the distinction between management control
and operational control is ill-defined, the processes overlap
and are interrelated. Figure 3 is presented to clarify the
categories
.
Despite the presentation of these discrete elements,
the planning and control process is a continuum. Management
control is a process carried on within guidelines established
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by strategic planning. Objectives, facilities, organization,
and financial factors are accepted as given operational
constraints. Operational control takes place within a context
of decisions made and rules formulated in the management con-
trol process and to some extent in the strategic planning
process. Overall performance of operational control activities
are reviewed as part of the management control process.
Anthony discusses two other processes distinct from
management control. The first is information handling , the
process of collecting, manipulating and transmitting informa-
tion, whatever its use. The author presents two reasons for
regarding this process as separate from the other elements.
Although useful for planning and control, information is
primarily handled for a functional purpose and the system
is designed to meet the requirement of these purposes. Also,
there is a recognized body of knowledge and skill, an expert-
ise, which identifies information handling as a separate process
The first three processes are concerned with activi-
ties which occur inside an organization. The final process has
an external orientation.
Financial accounting is defined as the process of
reporting objective financial information about the organiza-
tion to the outside world. The distinction is made that
society has developed certain financial accounting principles
to which all businesses are expected to adhere, whereas no
such externally imposed principles govern management control
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information — the accounting information useful to internal
parties for solving problems and achieving goals.
Figure 4 interrelates the five topics just discussed.
The management control process, the starting point in
constructing a planning and control system, will be discussed
in more detail below. It is this system which deals with the
continuing operation of the whole enterprise.
2 . The Management Control Process
In Management Control in Nonprofit Organizations
,
Anthony and Herzlinger recognize the informal and formal
process concerned with an organization's current operations.
The informal management control process consists of memoranda,
meetings, and conversations. The formal management control
system includes information on planned (or estimated) and
actual data on outputs, goods and services, and inputs,
resources. Prior to actual operations, decisions and esti-
mates are made as to what outputs and inputs are to be; during
actual operations, records are maintained as to what output
and input actually are; and subsequent to operations, reports
are prepared that compare actual outputs and inputs to planned
outputs and inputs and action is taken on the basis of these
reports.
The formal management control process, figure 5,










































In this phase, decisions are made with respect to
the major programs the organization plans to undertake during
the coming time period. These decisions are usually made in
the context of the objectives and strategies that have already
been determined. It is within this step that the strategic
and management control processes merge.
Organizations may state their programs in the form
of a long-range plan which shows planned outputs and inputs
for a number of years ahead, three, five or as many as twenty
years.
In an industrial company, the "programs" are usually
business lines or products. In a nonprofit organization, the
principal programs are the mission areas, such as strategic
forces, intelligence and communications, research and develop-
ment, and training programs within the Navy. The plans state
the amount and character of resources, inputs, to be devoted
to each program and the ways in which these resources are to
be used. The accounting information used at this point is
program data and provides full cost information for a specific
program.
Where possible, program decisions are based on a
comparative economic analysis as to whether the estimated
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benefits from the program are equal or greater than the esti-
mated costs. For many programs, particularly in nonprofit
organizations, reliable estimates of benefits cannot be made.
In these cases, decisions are based on judgments and are
influenced by the persuasive abilities of program advocates,
and by political and other considerations,
b. Budgeting
A budget is a plan expressed in quantified terms
covering a specified period of time, usually one year. In
this process, the program is translated into terms that cor-
respond to the sphere of responsibility of those who must
execute it. Thus, the plans of the program phase are con-
verted into organizational terms in the budget phase. The
process of arriving at this budget is essentially one of
negotiation between the managers of individual units, respon-
sibility centers, and their superiors. The end product of the
negotiations is a statement of the outputs that are expected
during the budget year and the resources that are to be used
in achieving these outputs.
This budget is a bilateral commitment. Responsi-
bility center managers commit themselves to produce the plan-
ned output with the agreed amount of resources and their
superiors commit themselves to agreeing that such performance
is satisfactory unless circumstances change.
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c. Operating and Management
During the period of actual operations, records
are kept of resources actually consumed and outputs actually
achieved. The records of resources consumed (costs) are
structured so that costs are collected by program and by
organization. Program costs are used as a basis for future
programming and organization costs are used to measure the
performance of the heads of organizational units. Related
to the collection of information is the process of internal
auditing. It consists of procedures intended to ensure that
the information is accurate and that the opportunities for an
undetected departure from plans and policies, and for theft or
defalcation are kept to a minimum. In organizations of any
size, a separate internal auditing organization exists to
ensure adherence to these procedures.
d, Reporting and Analysis
Accounting information, as well as nonquantifiable
and nonmonetary data is summarized, analyzed and reported to
those who are responsible for knowing what is happening in
the organization and for improving performance. These reports
essentially compare planned outputs and inputs with actual
outputs and inputs.
The information is used for three purposes: as a
basis for coordinating and controlling the current activities
of the organization, as a basis of evaluating operational
managers performance, and as a basis for program evaluation.
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Thus the closed loop of the four steps of a management control
system are demonstrated in that evaluation of actual performance
can lead back to the first step, a revision of the program.
Anthony makes some generalizations about management
control systems based on his analysis. [Ref. 24]
A formal management control system is a total sys-
tem in the sense that it embraces all aspects of the organiza-
tion's operations. Such a total system provides information
necessary so that management can ensure all parts of the
operation are in balance with one another.
A management control system should be designed so
that the actions it leads managers to take in accordance with
their perceived self-interest are also actions that are in the
best interest of the organization. This is the concept of
goal congruence.
A management control system is built around a
financial structure with resource expressed in monetary units.
Money is the common denominator by means of which the hetero-
geneous elements of resources can be combined and compared.
Thus, the accounting system serves as a unifying core for all
types of information. Although this monetary focus is central,
nonmonetary measures are also important parts of the system.
A management control system should be a coordinated,
integrated system. Data collected for different purposes
should be reconcilable with one another.
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Even though the controller of an organization is
responsible for the design and operation of the management
control system, decisions about management control should be
made by line managers. Their judgments are incorporated in
the approved plans, and they are the persons who must influence
others. Staff people, such as the controller, present informa-
tion that is useful in the process. However, the significant
decisions are those of line managers.
Based on this theoretical background of the ele-
ments of a planning and control system and the process of
management control, the following sections will compare the
establishment of systems of internal control in the private
and public sector.
C. ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF INTERNAL CONTROL IN THE
PRIVATE SECTOR
As organizations strive to attain their objectives, manage-
ment is responsible for establishing and maintaining its system
of internal controls in order to provide reliable data, safe-
guard assets and records, promote operational efficiency, and
encourage adherence to prescribed policies.
1 . Transaction Cycles
Since the independent auditor places primary emphasis
on the first two of the above concerns, in establishing its
system of internal control, the private sector firm emphasizes
the general objectives of authorization, accounting, and asset
safeguarding to ensure the prevention of errors in the recording
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of economic transactions. These general goals are tailored to
meet specific objectives within each financial transaction
cycle of a particular company. Transaction cycles are the
processes used to initiate and perform related activities,
create the necessary documentation, and gather and report
related data. Traditionally, there are five of these cycles





EXAMPLES OF AREAS INVOLVED
Customer acceptance, credit, shipping, sales,
sales deductions, cash receipts, receivables,
allowance for doubtful accounts, accounting
for warranties, etc.
EXPENDITURE Purchasing, payroll, cash disbursements,





Inventory valuation, property accounting,




Capital stock and debt, investments, treasury
stock, stock options, dividends, etc.
Preparation of financial statements and related
disclosures of other financial information,
including controls over financial statement
valuation and estimation decisions, selec-
tion of accounting principles, unusual or
nonrecurring activities and decisions, and
those which are not transactional in nature,
such as contingencies. [Ref. 25]
Figure 6 shows the flow of financial transactions
for each of these cycles and the interrelationship between













































2. Specific Control Objectives and Procedures
Within the revenue cycle, specific control objectives
with specific control procedures and techniques to ensure they
are met are illustrated here:
REVENUE CYCLE
Specific Objectives Control Procedures and Techniques
Authorization Objectives
Types of goods and services
to be provided
Credit terms and policies
should be properly
authorized
- Authorization procedures for
nonstandard goods or services
- Established credit policies
- Policies for investigating
customer credit worthiness
- Periodic review of credit
limits
Accounting Objectives
Deliveries of goods and
services should result in
preparation of accurate
and timely billing forms.
- Procedures to account for all
shipments and comparison of
shipments and billings.
- Independent checks of quantity
of goods shipped.
Asset Safeguarding Objectives
Access to cash receipts and
related records should be
controlled to prevent un-
recorded cash receipts or
abstraction of recorded
cash receipts
- Independent control of cash
receipts (lock box, cash
register)
- Restrictive endorsement of
checks upon receipt
- Segregation of duties: cash





3. Elements of Internal Control
Factors that shape the internal accounting control
environment include:
a well-defined organization plan with clear lines of
authority and responsibility
competent, trustworthy personnel
adequate segregation of duties
proper procedures for authorization
adequate documents and records
physical controls over assets and records
independent checks on performance.
Along with a proper functional division of the activi-
ties of an organization, responsibility for the performance of
duties must be specifically assigned so that accountability
can be maintained and corrective action implemented as
necessary.
The careful selection of competent, trustworthy person-
nel cannot be overemphasized. Honest, efficient people can
perform at a high level even when few other controls are
operational.
Adequate segregation of duties includes the separa-
tion of the following functions: authorization of, accounting
for, custody of, and recordkeeping duties related to assets.
An organization structure that allows this separation of duties
will lessen the likelihood of fraud but opportunities still
exist for collusion or management override.
45

Each transaction must be properly authorized. General
authorizations allow employees to process transactions within
the limits set by management policy. Specific authorizations
are applied to individual transactions where approval is
granted on a case-by-case basis.
Documents and records are the physical objects upon
which transactions are entered and summarized. They serve to
transmit information through an organization and to other
organizations. The documents must provide reasonable assurance
that assets are properly controlled and transactions are cor-
rectly recorded.
The most important type of protective measure for
safeguarding assets and records is the use of physical controls
such as inventory storerooms, safes, backup records.
The requirement for internal verification arises
because a system tends to change over time unless there is a
mechanism for frequent review. Personnel are likely to forget
procedures, become careless, or intentionally fail to follow
them unless someone is there to observe and evaluate their
performance. Fraudulent and unintentional errors are always
possible regardless of the quality of the controls. It is
important that internal verification be done by a person
independent of the original preparer of the data. A "built-in"




4 . Internal Audit Function
An internal audit staff is widely used by larger firms
to review their internal control system. This organization
performs many of the same investigative and evaluative func-
tions of the independent' auditor. The primary difference is
that this staff is not independent of management whereas the
independent auditor must be so in order to remain credible
with third parties. Although the independent auditor is not
permitted to rely entirely on evidence accumulated by internal
auditors, the existence of an adequate staff can greatly reduce
the evidence he must gather during his external audit.
An important point should be noted here: the internal
control system itself is a preventive measure; internal auditors
review the operation of an implemented system, a detection
measure. With an effective, efficient system, there should be
few adverse findings by an internal audit staff.
These elements of internal control were originally
defined in 1948 and were reaffirmed by the Special Advisory
Committee on Internal Control in 1979.
D. ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF INTERNAL CONTROL IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR
As in the private sector, management in executive federal
agencies is responsible for establishing and maintaining
internal control systems which prevent the occurrence of
potential risks in a cost effective manner.
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The public sector has relied heavily on procedures estab-
lished for commercial business.
1 . Event Cycles
The first step in the public sector in setting up a
system of internal control is the identification of event
cycles. This is the same concept as the financial transaction
cycles within the private sector but it has been expanded by
the OMB Guidelines for the Evaluation and Improvement of and
Reporting on Internal Control Systems in the Federal Government
to include each program and administrative function performed
within an executive agency or component of it. Appendix B of
the Guidelines presents a list of a limited number of event
cycles commonly found in federal agencies along with suggested
specific internal control objectives for each one. Unfortunately,
this appendix does not provide corresponding control techniques
to ensure the objectives are met. Such information would be
helpful for these specific objectives and serve as a basis for
extrapolation to design internal control review processes
that are appropriate for each organization's specific objec-
tives within its unique transaction cycles.
Arthur Andersen & Co. suggests an alternative method
of organizing the events that affect each agency:
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CYCLE EXAMPLES OF AREAS INVOLVED
1. POLICY AND Policy and plans are developed
PLANNING
2. BUDGET Budget is approved,- appropria-
tions and allotments are made
3. PROGRAM Resources are used to accomplish
agency missions.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE Resources needed for programs
are acquired and controlled
5. REPORTING Previous events are summarized
and reported. [Ref. 28J
The interrelationships of these cycles are shown in figure 7.
Within this proposed methodology, there are numerous
program, or mission cycles: grants, loans, income security,
defense, regulatory, law enforcement, research and development,
information and intelligence, taxation, insurance, production
of goods and services, and construction; as well as a number
of administrative cycles: personnel, procurement, disburse-
ments, receipts, asset and liability management, and adminis-
trative support.
Figure 8 parallels the similar picture from the private
sector, illustrating the flow of transactions and the inter-
relationships between them.
2 . Specific Control Objectives and Procedures
To further relate these ideas to the previous discus-
sion of the private sector, specific control objectives with
their specific control procedures or techniques for the defense
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Specific Objectives Control Procedures or Techniques
Authorization
Strategic and tactical





The command, base, or unit
activities should be auth-
orized in accordance with
laws, regulations, treaties
and the strategic and
tactical defense plans
The deployment of forces and
weapons should be authorized




be established and maintained
in accordance with
management's policy.
All plans down to the unit and
base level are approved by the
proper command level
.
Written defintions of authorized
activities for each command,
base and unit are provided to
commanders
.
Communication of strategic and
tactical plans.
Command chain is defined and
followed.
Communication networks are used
to authorize and report actions.
Fail-safe approvals are required
for critical activities.
Detailed disposition planning.
Reports of unit deployments.






Only those requests to
utilize weapons and troops
that are in accordance with
defense plans and manage-
ment's policy should be
approved.






Use of troops and weapons in
exercises and other activi-
ties should be accurately and
promptly reported.
Materials and supplies,
ammunition, fuel and other
resources used in conduct-











Activities carried out and
related costs should be
accurately classified,
summarized, and reported.
Changes in disposition of
troops and weapons and
related costs should be
accurately applied to the
proper records.
Costs of resources utilized
in conducting defense acti-
vities should be applied in
the proper accounting period
to the financial systems.
Cost accounting systems that
report costs of resources used
Management review of cost
reports
.





Access to weapons and
resources should be permit-
ted only in accordance with
laws, regulations, treaties
and management's policy.





Access to records, forms, Military police,
processing areas and
processing procedures should Base physical access controlled,
be permitted only in accord-
ance with law, regulation [Ref. 31]
and management's policy.
* Accounting Objectives
+ Asset Safeguarding Objectives
3. Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal
Government
The FMFIA requires that " ... internal accounting and
administrative controls of each executive agency shall be
established in accordance with standards prescribed by the
Comptroller General" of the GAO. The definitive standards
were issued 1 June 1983. These general and specific standards
are a melding of the private sector's general control objec-
tives of authorization, accounting and asset safeguarding and
the factors that shape the internal accounting control
environment, as well as a few original elements.
a. General Standards
CD Reasonable Assurance . Control systems are to
provide reasonable assurance that the objectives of the system
will be accomplished. The standard recognizes that the cost
of a control should not exceed the benefits derived therefrom
and that the benefits consist of reductions in the risks of
failing to achieve the stated control objectives. This evalua-




(2) Supportive Attitude . Managers and employees
are to maintain and demonstrate a positive and supportive
attitude toward controls at all times.
(3) Competent Personnel . Managers and employees
are to have personal and professional integrity and are to
maintain a level of competence that allows them to accomplish
their assigned duties , as well as understand the importance
of developing and implementing good controls.
(4) Control Objectives . (Specific) control objec-
tives are to be identified or developed for each agency activity
(program or administrative function) and are to be logical,
applicable, and reasonably complete.
(5) Control Techniques . Control techniques are
to be effective and efficient in accomplishing their control
objectives. These techniques are to be designed to accomplish
the specific control objectives consistently. When in place
and functioning properly, these methods and procedures prevent
errors and, as such, can be considered strengths in the sys-
tem of internal control.
b. Specific Standards
(1) Documentation . Control systems and all trans-
actions and other significant events are to be clearly




(2) Recording of Transactions and Events . Trans-
actions and other significant events are to be promptly
recorded and properly classified.
(3) Execution of Transactions and Events . Trans-
actions and other significant events are to be authorized and
executed only by persons acting within the scope of their
authority. Independent evidence is to be maintained that proper
authorizations are issued and that the transactions conform
with the terms of the authorizations.
(4) Separation of Duties . Key duties and responsi-
bilities in authorizing, processing, recording, and reviewing
transactions should be separated among individuals. Key
duties such as authorizing, approving, and recording trans-
actions, issuing or receiving assets, making payments, and
reviewing or auditing are to be assigned to separate individ-
uals to minimize the risk of loss to the government. Internal
management control depends largely on the reduced opportunities
to make and conceal errors or to engage in, or conceal
irregularities. This, in turn, depends on the assignment of
work so that no one individual controls all phases of an
activity or transaction, thereby creating a situation that
permits errors or irregularities to go undetected.
(5) Supervision . Qualified and continuous super-
vision is to be provided to ensure that control objectives are
achieved and to ensure that approved procedures are followed.




(6) Access to and Accountability for Resources .
Access to resources and records is to be limited to authorized
individuals, and accountability for the custody and use of
resources is to be assigned and maintained. Periodic compari-
son shall be made of the resources with the recorded account-
ability to determine whether the two agree. The frequency of
the comparison shall be a function of the vulnerability of
the asset.
c. Audit Resolution Standard
(1) Prompt Resolution of Audit Findings . Managers
are to promptly evaluate findings and recommendations reported
by auditors, determine proper actions in response to audit
findings and recommendations, and complete, within established
timeframes, all actions that correct or otherwise resolve the
matters brought to management's attention.
4 . Internal Audit Function
As mentioned previously, large private firms maintain
internal audit staffs to detect breakdowns in their internal
control systems. Corresponding functions in the public sector
include internal review, internal audit, and the inspector
general.
a. Internal Review
Internal Review is defined by SECNAVINST 7 510. 8A
of 7 December 1982 as the conducting of audits, studies,
analyses, or evaluations of command operations. It provides a
responsive, independent, in-house means to detect deficiencies,
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improprieties, or inefficiencies, and to provide recommenda-
tions to correct conditions which adversely affect mission
accomplishment or command integrity.
Internal reviews can be used in any operational
or functional area to ensure that resources have been em-
ployed effectively, efficiently, and within legal and adminis-
trative constraints. As stated previously, its purpose is to
detect after-the-fact deficiencies, improprieties and inef-
ficiencies as opposed to the preventive objectives of internal
control
.
The ideal placement of the function is as a staff
capacity to the commanding officer to ensure independence from
operational activities and objectivity in the internal evalua-
tion of the organization.
A review of the instruction indicates that sections
on programming for internal review and the actual conducting
of an internal review are closely related to aspects of the
internal control program and the function of auditing
respectively. As in the internal control program, this pro-
gram requires an annual activity review plan to provide
adequate coverage for functional areas with known or suspected
problems and components must prepare an inventory of review-
able areas, the major functions performed by the activity.
Consideration is given to expected benefits of a review and
the risk associated with not reviewing an area. Priority is
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given to reviews in highly vulnerable functions, those activi-
ties most susceptible to fraud, waste, or illegal activity as
determined by command vulnerability assessments.
The actual conduct of a review parallels the
steps auditors would follow in their examination of an
organization. Standards, to be discussed below, are speci-
fied; reviews address financial, compliance, effectiveness
and efficiency, or program issues or a combination of these;
reviews evaluate the adequacy of internal controls; the use
of audit programs addressed to specific functional areas is
encouraged; working papers are to be maintained, the review,
reporting, and follow-up procedures all rely on the auditor's
approach.
SECNAVINST 7510. 8A states internal audit, func-
tion of the Naval Audit Service, and internal review are not
duplicative, but rather supplemental to each other. Within
DON, internal audit tailors its audit coverage in recognition
of internal review evaluations. Therefore, internal review
efforts complement, rather than duplicate, those of internal
audit.
b t Naval Audit Service (NAS)
The Auditor General of the Navy has responsibility
for the Navy's internal audit program.
The overall objective of the Naval Audit Service
is to assist Navy managers at all levels in the effective
discharge of their responsibilities by:
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furnishing objective analyses, appraisals, recommenda-
tions, and pertinent comments concerning the activities
and programs reviewed;
determining whether prescribed Navy policies and pro-
cedures in any area of operations are being complied
with;
and determining whether the interests of the Govern-
ment are being adequately protected.
By disclosing the existence of unauthorized or
improper practices and the causes of errors, audit provides
protective service to management. When management policies
are found to be ineffective or procedures are found to be
uneconomical, the auditor can recommend appropriate action.
Audit reviews all aspects of operations that
involve the use of public funds or resources and makes rec-
ommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
operations.
It is NAS policy to conduct audits of naval
organizations and programs on a mission-oriented basis. Other
functions are examined based upon the degree to which they
support mission accomplishment.
Comprehensive audits evaluate the adequacy of
policies and procedures, the effectiveness and efficiency of
operations and the accuracy of records and reports in both
mission and support departments.
c. Inspector General of the Navy
The Inspector General Act of 1978 formally estab-
lished this function which basically replicated the Service's
auditing and internal review roles. In order to increase
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economy and efficiency in the executive branch of the govern-
ment, the Inspector General's basic responsibilities were
defined. as
:
Conducting and supervising audits and investigations
relating to the programs and operations of their
agencies
;
- Providing leadership and coordination and recommend-
ing policies for other activities designed to promote
economy and efficiency and prevent and detect fraud
and abuse in such programs and operations; and
Keeping their agency head and the Congress informed
about the administrative problems and deficiencies
and the necessity for and progress of corrective
actions
.
5 . Standards for Audit of Governmental Organizations,
Programs, Activities, and Functions
All three of the above programs must meet the Standards
for Audit of Governmental Organizations, Programs, Activities,
and Functions issued by the Government Accounting Office (GAO)
.
As mentioned in Chapter II, the AICPA has adopted
standards applicable to private sector audits performed to
express opinions on the fairness of the presentation of
financial statements.
GAO has incorporated these guidelines into its own
standards for government audits but in recognition of the
broader interests of many users of government audit reports,
has also included additional standards for expanded scope
audits
.
Officials and employees who manage public programs
must be prepared to render a full account of their activities
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to public officials, legislators, and the taxpaying public.
These parties are interested in knowing whether government
funds are properly handled and in compliance with laws and
regulations and whether government organizations are achiev-
ing the purposes for which programs were authorized and funded
and are doing so economically and efficiently.
Therefore, GAO's standards provide for the concept of
expanded scope auditing to ensure full accountability. The
three elements of expanded scope auditing are:
Financial and compliance, determines: whether the
financial statements present fairly the financial
position and whether laws and regulations that have
a material effect upon the financial statements have
been complied with.
- Economy and efficiency, determines: whether resources
are being managed economically and efficiently, the
causes of inefficiencies or uneconomical practices,
whether laws and regulations concerning economy and
efficiency have been complied with.
Programs Results, determines: whether the desired
results or benefits established by the legislature
or other authorizing body are being achieved and
whether the agency has considered alternatives that
might yield desired results at a lower cost. [Ref. 32]
Within the framework of the three elements of the
concept of expanded scope audit, the various AICPA and GAO
standards are applied. Internal controls are mentioned
specifically as described below.
If a particular audit is focused on financial and
compliance areas, the AICPA auditing standards are applicable




The auditors shall report on their study and evaluation
of internal accounting controls made as part of the
financial and compliance audit. They shall identify as
a minimum: (1) the entity's significant internal ac-
counting controls, (2) the controls identified that
were evaluated, (3) the controls identified that were not
evaluated, and (4) the material weaknesses identified as
a result of the evaluation. [Ref. 33]
If a particular audit emphasizes economy and efficiency
or program results, the unique GAO examination and evaluation
standard requires that:
During the audit a study and examination shall be made
of the internal control system (administrative controls)
applicable to the organization, program, activity, or
function under audit. [Ref. 34]
A corresponding reporting standard for government
audits of economy and efficiency or program results requires
that:
The report shall include ... a description of material
weaknesses found in the internal control system (administra-
tive controls) . [Ref. 35]
Thus GAO has recognized the importance of administrative and
accounting internal controls even though it has separated
their reviews in different types of audits. An organization
cannot separate its controls in the continuing effort to
reach its objectives through effective and efficient manage-
ment of its resources.
Recognizing that the Navy's instruction on internal
control is quite recent but also noting that the original
OMB guidance was published in October, 1981, it is still
unclear how these similar functions relate and interact with
the internal control program.
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Office of the Comptroller's (NAVCOMPT) letter of
2 July 8 2 stated that the majority of internal control reviews
are to be performed by Navy Audit Service (NAVAUDSVC) and
command or activity internal review components; SECNAV's
letter of 5 January 19 83 stated that personnel performing
internal control reviews may be auditors; internal reviewers,
inspectors, supervisors, etc.; and NAVCOMPT' s letter of
5 April 83 provided that management (changed from internal)
control reviews were to be performed by the managers
responsible. It is not surprising that activities have been
confused about the integration of these functions.
The best current guidance available makes these
distinctions: internal reviews are more structured, are done
as a staff function to the commanding officer by personnel
independent of operational responsibilities, and the findings
are kept within the command, whereas internal control reviews
are less structured, are done by the managers involved in the
program or administrative function, and the findings are
referred up through the chain of command. Internal review
staffs are encouraged to provide training and guidance in
the design and review of internal control systems, but man-
agers should not actually establish and maintain their own
systems in order for the full benefit to be attained.
Further definitive clarification among these functions






Reviewing this chapter, it is clear that neither CPA firms
nor the public sector has really integrated its internal
control system in the broader framework of management control
but rather have chosen to emphasize internal accounting
controls which are closely related to operational controls.
(Later we will see that corporate management has taken the
broader approach to management control.) Such a system does
not focus on the wider information needs of managers for
administrative/ as well as accounting, data necessary to
monitor the continuing operations of an organization as it
strives to attain program and financial goals.
It is recognized that each organization is unique and
internal controls must fit the particular situation but all
systems should be integrated in the broader framework of
management control.
There is a danger of attempting to adapt the financial
auditing literature written for professional auditors'
limited purposes (CPA audits) since these writings provide
managers with little enlightenment for their decision making
and planning and control requirements.
F. LIMITATIONS OF INTERNAL CONTROL
Whether in the public or private sector, the establish-
ment of an internal control system can provide reasonable,
but not absolute assurance that the organization's activities
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are being accomplished in accordance with its specific
objectives
.
In SAS No. 1, the AICPA has identified internal control
limitations
:
In the performance of most control procedures, there
are possibilities for errors arising from such causes
as misunderstanding of instructions, mistakes of judg-
ment, and personal carelessness, distraction or fatigue.
Furthermore, procedures whose effectiveness depends on
segregation of duties obviously can be circumvented by
collusion. Similarly, procedures designed to assure the
execution and recording of transactions in accordance
with management's authorizations may be ineffective
against either errors or irregularities perpetrated by
management with respect to transactions or to the esti-
mates and judgments required in the preparation of
financial statements. In addition to the limitations
discussed above, any projection of a current evaluation
of internal accounting control to future periods is
subject to the risk that the procedures may become
inadequate because of changes in conditions and that the
degree of compliance with the procedures may deteriorate.
[Ref. 36]
Internal control must be dynamic adapting to the ever-
changing external and internal environment within which an
evolving organization operates. Loss of a key employee,
introduction of a new function, activation or de-activation
of an activity or facility are all events requiring a decision
to determine whether existing controls should be reduced,
increased, or simply maintained.
Considerations of cost/benefit and reasonable assurance
require management to maintain a constant awareness of sys-
tem limitations as well as organizational vulnerability and
risk. The direct and indirect costs of excessive controls




IV. REVIEW OF INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will compare the review of internal control
systems as done in both the private and public sectors and thus
demonstrate the closeness of the procedures despite the fact
that the examinations of systems were originally intended to
have different goals.
B. OVERVIEW OF AUDIT PROCESS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
1. Study of the Current System
The private sector auditor begins his review of the
internal control system by obtaining a general understanding
of the client's industry and the client's specific business
since the nature of that business affects the controls a
company must have to provide reliable financial data and to
safeguard assets. Interviews with the chief financial officer
and other key personnel help the auditor develop a knowledge
of the formal internal control procedures established by the
firm. A detailed organization chart and the procedures manual
are useful in studying the prescribed system. The data ob-
tained should provide an overview of the system.
In order to obtain more specific information about the
flow of documents and records and the nature of specific




A flowchart provides a diagrammatic representation
of the client's documents and their sequential flow through
the organization. The origin, subsequent processing, and
the final disposition of each record is illustrated. The
flowchart also provides information concerning the separation
of duties, authorizations, approvals and internal verifica-
tions that occur within the system, as well as facilitating
the identification of inadequacies of present system operations
The final format of the flowchart should describe the
system and procedures actually in place which may be quite
different from those established by management. Interviews
with involved employees and auditor observation produce this
accurate picture
.
After the flow diagram is completed, the auditor
selects a "sample of one" of each source document described
in the flowchart and follows it from its origin to its final
disposition — a "walk- through" test. Increased understanding
of the system, as well as disclosure of errors or incomplete
portions of the flowchart, are benefits gained by this
procedure.
An internal control questionnaire is designed to
ask a series of questions about the controls in each audit
area as a means of indicating to the auditor aspects of the
system that may be inadequate. It is designed to require a
yes or no response with a no response indicating potential
lack of internal control.
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The main advantage of the questionnaire is the rela-
tive completeness of coverage of each audit area that a good
survey device affords. The main disadvantage is that an
overall view of the entire cycle is not provided.
As with flowcharts, it is important to determine
whether management's prescribed controls are actually being
followed
.
2 . Preliminary Evaluation of the System - Compliance
Testing
Once the independent auditor understands how the
internal accounting control system functions, he makes a
preliminary assessment of existing controls, noting strengths
which prevent errors and weaknesses which permit errors or
irregularities
.
This preliminary evaluation is done for each financial
transaction cycle on an individual basis by testing a repre-
sentative sample of documents in a walk-through test. Internal
control techniques or procedures should have been established
to ensure specific control objectives are met. If the auditor
finds these methods in place and operational, he can assume
that information generated in this area is likely to be correct
and therefore, reduce, not eliminate, the extent of his tests
for monetary errors (substantive tests). If evidence gathered
indicates that internal control techniques have not been
established or are not functioning, the auditor's expectation
of errors in that area rises and he must increase the amount
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of evidence accumulated to ensure that the potential error
is immaterial. It is during this phase of the evaluation,
called compliance testing , that the auditor identifies material
weaknesses (Figure 9) in the internal control systems.
3
.
Substantive Tests of Financial Balances
Substantive audit tests are tests for monetary errors
in transactions and account balances. These tests are partly
based on the auditor's recognition of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the client's internal control system during compliance
testing. These further tests are to determine whether the
ending balances and footnotes in financial statements are
fairly stated. Substantive tests reduce the risk that any
material errors that occur will not be detected by the
examination.
4 Reevaluation
After all substantive tests are completed, the auditor
summarizes his findings for all financial transaction areas
to determine if sufficient evidence has been accumulated to
issue an audit opinion.
5 Audit Opinion
The type of audit opinion given depends on the results
of the compliance and substantive tests. If significant
errors have been found, it may be necessary to reevaluate the
quality of internal control.
71

CONSIDERATIONS OF MATERIALITY IN THE
PRIVATE SECTOR
The concept of materiality as it relates to auditing is
simply that the auditor should concentrate on the financial
statement information that is important . . . more likely to be
significantly misstated ... in a given situation, the auditor
must establish whether the account or transaction under con-
sideration contains errors or omissions that, when combined
with other possible errors in the statements, will make the
overall financial statements misleading.
Important facets:
Materiality is a relative concept rather than an
absolute one.
Net income is the usual basis for evaluating
materiality.
The combined errors are more important than errors in
individual accounts.
Accounts with small recorded balances can contain
material errors.
Figure 9 [Ref. 37J
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"As companies contiue to grow, auditing must concentrate on
testing management's systems of controls if any semblance of
audit efficiency is to be maintained. As auditors rely more
and more on management's control systems, they must develop
a more pervasive understanding of the client's business and
transactions. Thus, the broader definition of internal
control may be a more useful approach to performing an
effective independent audit. [Ref. 38]
C. OVERVIEW OF THE REVIEW AND UPDATING OF PUBLIC SECTOR
INTERNAL CONTROL
OMB ' s Guidelines for the Evaluation, Improvement of and
Reporting on Internal Control Systems in the Federal Government
of December 1982 are based primarily on the techniques just
described for use by independent auditors in the private
sector but are also expanded to encompass controls necessary
for program and operational activities. In light of the recent
revisions to pertinent documents/ it is questionable how long
this expanded view will last.
Be that as it may, the public sector segments the review
process into three phases, figure 10.
1 . Phase 1: Organizing the Evaluation
This phase includes the assignment of internal control
responsibilities within agencies and the identification of
agency components and programs and functions . The OMB Guide-
lines provide general instructions in these areas and SECNAVINST
5200.35 addresses Navy particulars.
A point of clarification should be made here: The
draft DOD Directive defines the term Assessable Unit as an
identified function within an organizational unit with
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significant management responsibilities. Within each organiza-
tional unit, the manager is responsible for developing, main-
taining, and monitoring a system of management control regarding
the mission function and the common management functions
within the organizational unit ... this approach, a combination
of organization and functions, provides for an efficient span
of control by assigning primary responsibility to the organiza-
tion unit manager for managing the process (and) performing
management control reviews.
According to SECNAVINST 5200.35 each command and
activity is to " ... select the programs/functions which repre-
sent a significant level of effort within an organization.
These major areas should then be broken down into (subprograms/
subfunctions) which are the aspects of the major area per-
formed by the command/activity. For example, "Supply" at a
field activity might be broken down into warehousing, SERVMART,
shop stores, etc."
2 . Phase 2; Vulnerability Assessment
A vulnerability assessment is a management evaluation
of a program or function aimed at identifying the potential
for mismanagement, loss, fraud, or waste in that program or
function. The objective of these assessments is to attain a
The Navy Instruction uses the term assessable units here.




ranking of all programs and functions within an organization
in terms of their susceptibility to loss or unauthorized use
of resources, errors in reports or information, illegal or
unethical acts and/or adverse or unfavorable opinions.
Steps in the vulnerability assessment process include:
a. Analysis of General Control Environment
The factors used here are drawn directly from the
GAO document , Executive Reporting on Internal Controls in
Government and the previously mentioned AICPA document, Report
on the Special Advisory Committee on Internal Accounting Control
They include: management attitude, organization structure,
personnel delegation and communication of authority and respon-
sibility, budgeting and reporting practices, and organizational
checks and balances.
b. Analysis of Inherent Risk
This second step is the performance of an analysis
for each identified program and administrative function of the
inherent potential for waste, loss, unauthorized use or mis-
appropriation due to the nature of the program or function.
c. Preliminary Evaluation of Safeguards
A preliminary judgment is made regarding the
existence and adequacy of internal control over the specific
programs and administrative functions subject to the guidelines.
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d. Summarizing the Results of Vulnerability Assessments
The reviewer makes an overall assessment of the
adherence of the program or administrative function's internal
control system to at least some of the prescribed standards and
the vulnerability of the program or administrative function
itself. The process and results must be documented and a
conclusion reached as to overall vulnerability, e.g., highly
vulnerable, requiring a detailed review of internal controls;
moderately vulnerable, permitting less intensive and less fre-
quent internal control reviews; absence of vulnerability, etc.
Problems or weaknesses requiring immediate correc-
tive action may be observed during the performance of the
vulnerability assessments. Such situations should be brought
to the attention of the appropriate agency official as soon
as possible so that prompt corrective action can be taken.
3 . Develop Plan for Subsequent Actions
Completed vulnerability assessment documents are trans-
mitted to and maintained by the DON Review and Oversight
Council which is responsible for the final ranking of programs/
functions for DON as a whole. Upon completion of each biennial
vulnerability assessment, the Council will prescribe a minimum
number of high vulnerability areas which must be reviewed each
year.
Many similarities can be drawn between these first two
phases of the internal control review process in the public
sector with the independent auditor's study and preliminary
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evaluation of the client's internal control system. Again, no
specifics are provided and each organization must develop
procedures useful to its own situation.
4 . Phase 3: Conduct Internal Control Reviews
DON ' s 'instruction describes management control reviews
(also referred to as internal control reviews) as detailed
examinations of a program/function to ensure internal controls
exist, are documented, and are functioning as intended. These
reviews should identify weak, nonexistent, or excessive con-
trols and initiate actions necessary to correct noted
deficiencies. Management control reviews are performed at
each DON command and activity by the manager responsible for
the system of internal controls under review . The scope of a
review in a particular program or function should be commen-
surate with a unit's responsibility in that area.
This process is closely related to the procedures used
by the independent auditor for his limited purposes.
The following steps provide the basic approach to per-
forming reviews.
a. Identification of Transaction Cycles
If an effective system as previously described
has not been established, then the processes or events lead-
ing to accomplishment of a program or function must be
described. An organization may have a larger or smaller




b. Analysis of General Control Environment
These are the same general controls mentioned in
the vulnerability assessment process. If this analysis was
already a part of a vulnerability assessment, then a review of
it and update is all that is necessary.
c. Document Transaction Cycles
As in the private sector, flowcharts, accompanied
by appropriate narrative descriptions, facilitate the review
of current internal controls. Procedures, personnel, and
documents and records involved should be identified through
interviews and observation. A walk-through test is advisable
here too.
d. Evaluate Internal Controls
The next step is to determine if needed specific
internal control objectives and corresponding control tech-
niques are in place for each transaction cycle.
Control objectives are established because a risk
exists; internal control techniques are implemented to prevent
the specific risk from occurring. Pertinent examples have
been provided in the previous section which discussed the
establishment of an internal control system.
Inherent limitations which constrain an organiza-
tion's effort to maintain an effective system include: budget




During this step excessive controls should be
identified, as well as compensating controls — those which
offset a weak control.
Results of this step include an identification
of necessary internal controls, control objectives for which
better control techniques are needed, and unnecessary controls
that may be eliminated,
e. Test Internal Controls
This step is similar to the auditor's compliance
testing. The internal control techniques are tested to deter-
mine whether such controls are functioning as intended. Again,
a review of a representative sample of transactions is recom-
mended to see whether the general objectives of authorization,
accounting and asset safeguarding are met.
During this process, weaknesses and deficiencies
in the internal control system should be noted and corrective
actions considered.
f. Reporting the Results of Internal Control Reviews
The "final step of the internal control review
process is concerned with the reports which should result.
(1) Audit Resolution Standard . To comply with
the Comptroller General's Audit Resolution Standard, the
results should be reported to managers so they may evaluate
the findings and recommendations and initiate appropriate
corrective actions within established timeframes. Reports
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should contain an identification of weaknesses and recommenda-
tions to correct them.
(2) FMFIA Statement . Another provision of the
Act of 19 82 requires an annual statement by 31 December of
each year, commencing in 1983, from each agency head to the
President and Congress as to whether the agency has established
a system of internal accounting and administrative control in
accordance with the standards of the Comptroller General and
whether this system provides reasonable assurance that the
FMFIA objectives are met.
The collective existence of the below listed
elements provides evidence that management and other person-
nel throughout the organization are cognizant of the import-
ance of internal control and that the necessary evaluation
and improvement processes are taking place:
Responsibility for directing the program is assigned
to a high level official
Agency internal control directives and regulations are
published and disseminated
Documentation of the conduct and results of assessments
and reviews are maintained
Documentation of corrective actions taken to strengthen
the internal control systems is available
Inclusion of internal control elements in performance
appraisals
Written assurances from both the designated senior
official responsible for coordinating the agency-
wide effort and the heads of the agency's various




The Act also requires an agency to include
within the statement to the President and Congress a report
listing identified material weaknesses in internal accounting
and administrative control and a schedule for their correction.
A material weakness (Figure 11) is a situation in which the
designed procedures or the degree of operational compliance
therewith does not provide reasonable assurance that the
FMFIA objectives of internal control are being accomplished.
C3) Report on Agency's Accounting System . An
accounting system is an integral part of a management control
system since the accounting records and related procedures can
contribute significantly to attaining the objectives of the
control system.
Therefore, a separate report is also required
by the FMFIA attesting to whether or not the agency's account-
ing system conforms with requirements prescribed by the
Comptroller General.
A complete accounting system, for GAO approval
purposes, is one established to assist in the financial manage-
ment functions of budget formulation and execution, proprietary
accounting, and financial reporting. It is the total struc-
ture of methods and procedures used to record, classify, and
report information on the financial position and operations
of a governmental unit or any of its funds, balanced account
groups, and organizational components. Accounting systems,
for approval purposes, shall be comprised of the various
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CONSIDERATIONS OF MATERIALITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
A Material Weakness in internal accounting and administra-
tive controls is a condition in which the specific control
procedures or the degree of compliance with them do not reduce
to a relatively low level, the risk that errors or irregulari-
ties having a significant affect on operations may occur and
not be detected within a timely period by employees in the
normal course of performing their assigned functions. In
determining what has a significant or material affect on opera-
tions, a command should consider such factors as the amount of
assets exposed to weaknesses, the number of times errors or
irregularities have occurred or a predictable level of occur-
rence based on historical data, the range and distribution of
the errors or irregularities, the effect of a combination of
errors or irregularities on operations, and the quality of
the overall control environment.
Judgment must be exercised in deciding whether a weakness
in internal controls is material. Some common sense guidelines
include:
The dollar amount involved
Substantial violations of program directives or poor
management that could seriously affect program
accomplishment
Resultant requirements for major policy changes that
effect monetary or nonmonetary benefits at the DOD
level





The number of persons involved
The existence of extensive minor deficiencies that be-
come significant in the aggregate
The likely degree of impact upon unit readiness,
security or morale
The degree of notoriety likely to result
The existence of a systematic weakness that leaves





operations involving the authorizing, recording, classifying
and reporting of financial data related to revenues, expenses,
assets, liabilities, and equity. For each of these operations,
GAO review for approval will evaluate the procedures and
processes from the point a transaction is authorized through
processing of data (either manually or automatically) to
issuance of financial and management information reports con-
taining data in detail or summary form.
5 . The Burns System
To digress a moment, CAPT J. 0. Carlson, Ms. J. W.
Lewis, and Mr. J. F. Smith, Jr. describe an innovative method-
ology for the design, maintenance, implementation, and evalua-
tion of a network of internal control for accounting and
financial management systems developed for DON by Dr. D. C.
Burns
.
The best possible identification of all threats
against the system is developed. A threat is any adverse
impact upon the organization that could result from the
operation of the system. The potential impact of the threat
is quantified in dollar terms. Risks, the probability or
potential of the threat occurring, associated with each
threat, are then developed and quantified. The identification
of all possible controls, risk reduction processes or actions
(internal control techniques) , that could apply to the threats
is performed. These controls may be manual or automated and
can be internal or external to the system or organization.
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The best possible determination of the percentage of effective-
ness provided by each control against each threat is made,
recognizing that it is possible for the effectiveness of each
control to be different for different threats. The benefits,
the result, in dollar terms, of applying a control against
each threat, are then determined. This is done by multiplying
the quantified threat by the risks and again multiplying this
result by the effectiveness of the control. The result is
threats, risks, and benefits quantified in dollar terms,
Figure 12.
Since controls are threat-specific, the action of all
controls against a given threat must be developed along a
specific control path for each threat. This path shows threat-
specific relationships and control effectiveness, Figure 13.
The next step is to develop a matrix of threats to
controls. This shows the possible network of controls for
the system. The costs of each control are identified. This
results in the cost benefit relationship of the network of
controls, Figure 14. Since the Burns System uses a Threat/
Control Matrix, the application of the control costs shows
not only the cost of a control for each threat, but the
comparison of the cost of that control to the benefits of its
application against all relevant threats.
The matrix is then analyzed in one or more of a
variety of ways. The best possible unrestricted cost bene-









$ X = AMOUNT OF RISK POSED BY THE THREAT TO BE CONTROLLED
$ Y = AMOUNT RISK CONTROLLED
$ Z = AMOUNT OF UNCONTROLLED RISK
% = OPERATING CAPABILITY OF CONTROL TO REDUCE THREAT-
SPECIFIC RISK, EXPRESSED IN PERCENT TERMS
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under a given cost restriction, or any similar scenario can
be identified. A variety of sensitivity analysis simulations,
changing any one or combination of variables (e.g.: risk,
percentage of effectiveness, etc.) can be performed. All of
this is expressed in dollar terms, supported by documentation
produced with automated support.
This approach can be useful in the design of cost
beneficial networks of accounting and financial management
controls, as well as in the identification and evaluation of
existing networks of controls.
It should be recognized that this approach is limited
to areas of control which can be quantified. It is a less
useful method for evaluating controls in program and opera-
tional areas where quantitative data is limited or nonexistent
This system reverts to the limited scope of the independent
auditor's review of financial data and asset safeguarding
measures. It is not designed to consider the internal admin-
istrative controls which are also an important part of
management's concern. However, if OMB & DOD do move in the
direction of focusing on internal accounting controls, this
methodology will have useful applications.
D. CONCLUSION
A point requires consideration here: Is the auditor's
framework used for the review of accounting controls neces-
sarily adequate for the broader emphasis on administrative,
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as well as accounting, controls originally intended by OMB
and DOD? More appropriate guidance should stress the review
of management controls.
Again, specific guidance is not provided on how to review
internal control systems either in the public or private
sector. In large organizations, whether profit or nonprofit,
broad direction, which must be adapted to each situation,
makes the coordination and summarization of the nonuniform
reports into a single, cohesive statement difficult.
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V. INTERNAL CONTROL - A MANAGEMENT EMPHASIS
A. INTRODUCTION
Both the private and public sector originally accepted
the broad interpretation of the concept of internal control.
In the private sector, however, independent auditors success-
fully limited the scope of their responsibility to internal
accounting control. Even the AICPA recognized that this
definition was inadequate for management's purposes since
corporate executives should be concerned with all of the
controls contemplated in the inclusive definition of 1949.
Within the federal government, efforts to establish
internal control systems have been grounded on CAP ' s broad
interpretation of 1949. An attempt has been made to utilize
the professional auditing literature, originated for the narrow
purpose of internal accounting control, and expand it to
include program and operational functions as well. Now OMB
and DOD have revised their definition, moving backwards and
much closer to the idea of internal accounting control. It
is unclear how this revision will affect the establishment
of an internal control system which covers the entire spectrum
of an organization's functions. But one thing is certain,
such terminology changes serve to create confusion. And it is
to be hoped that federal managers will come to recognize their
concerns can only be encompassed in the 1949 AICPA statement.
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B. "INTERNAL CONTROL — A MANAGEMENT VIEW"
As part of a larger study on internal control in U.S.
corporations, Dr. R. K. Mautz and B. J. White wrote an article,
"Internal Control — a Management View," which proposes a
tentative managerial definition of internal (accounting) con-
trol and briefly attempts to integrate it within the frame-
work of the Planning and Control process found in organizations
Although the writing is addressed to the private sector, many
of the ideas are useful for public sector managers, as well,
and thus will be discussed here.
Management's interest in internal control:
... is likely to emphasize the positive aspects of internal
control measures ... (management is) interested not only
in the prevention of errors and irregularities but also
in the active accomplishment of the company's objectives.
The purpose of control is to get things done . . . manage-
ment ' s interest is more likely to run to activities to
be performed, resources to be utilized and information
essential for operational use than would the interests
of an auditor concerned with the propriety of financial
statements for external use. The totality of management
control is coextensive with company operations. Manage-
ment's controls are intended to plan, initiate, encourage,
guide and evaluate the company's activities. Any steps ...
influencing operations in order to accomplish the company's
objectives can be included in the total control system.
[Ref. 44]
Mautz and White see internal (accounting) control as an
addition to basic operations -- measures taken to avoid errors
and irregularities while operations are in progress. Opera-
tions could continue without internal accounting control,
although perhaps not as effectively. Without management
control, however, operations could not exist.
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These authors view control as necessary to see that:
employees perform certain actions that will have a
positive effect in accomplishing the company's
objectives
employees do not engage in activities that would be
dysfunctional in accomplishing those objectives
the company's assets are used for the purposes
intended, and no others.
Internal (accounting) control makes much of the safeguarding
of assets. From a management perspective, Mautz and White see
this concern as less important than utilizing assets in ways
appropriate to attaining the organization's goals. There is
a great deal of similarity between the above and Anthony's
planning and control framework.
Balance sheet assets are not the only resource to be
protected from improper use. A company's credit is a resource
as is its ability to raise funds. Therefore, the authors
suggest the use of the phrase 'utilization and conservation
of resources'. It avoids the rather sterile protective
implication of safeguarding and is broad enough to include
internal control measures for liability and equity items as
well.
Management has a dual control problem with information.
It must assure an adequate supply of reliable, timely informa-
tion to the members of the operating management . . . Management
also has a responsibility to maintain its access to the
capital market and ... to meet legal requirements by issuing
interim and annual financial statements . . . auditors tend
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to think of internal control as concerned primarily with this
external financial reporting.
Mautz and White next propose a conceptualization of
management control with ideal employees: assume a set of
conditions in which management need have no concern for
internal errors or irregularities since all employees are
efficient, prudent, honest, loyal, informed, and none are
susceptible to lapses of any kind. With essential instruc-
tion and guidance, they are competent and serious in attempt-
ing to perform in accordance with company policies, objectives,
and plans. In such a situation, the elements of a management
control system would include only control measures essential
to operations:
establishment of objectives (policy) for the company
and its operating components (conventional function
of the board of directors)
communication of objectives to those responsible
for implementation
implementation (.management function)
Planning operations to achieve objectives
Instructing employees about expected performance
Performance
Review of accomplishment and consideration of need
for modification of plans and policies.
The authors suggest additional elements since employees
are human and subject to faults and failings:
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Supervision to provide reasonable assurance that
employees
:
perform the activities for which employed and
do not undertake actions detrimental to the
accomplishment of stated objectives
utilize and conserve the company's resources
provide an adequate supply of reliable, timely
information for internal management purposes and
prepare periodic financial statements.
To ensure employee failure does not occur, Mautz and
White suggest specific practices and procedures tailored to
a company's activities which would be included in the manage-
ment control system:
Establishment of objectives for the company and its
operating components
Communication of objectives to those responsible
for implementation
Implementation
planning operations to achieve objectives
instructing employees on performance
performance, including supervision of performance
Utilization of precautions, incentives, and deterrents
to reduce the probability of errors and irregularities
and of measures to detect the existence of errors and
irregularities if these have occurred
Reviews of accomplishments and consideration of the
need for modification of plans and policies for:
effect of outside forces
any action needed to reduce the probability of
internal errors and irregularities.
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Thus, internal (accounting) control measures fit within
the management control system and become a part of it once
the assumption that employees are subject to errors and
irregularities is accepted.
Mautz and White define internal (accounting) control as ...
those measures employed by management to attain the objectives
of the enterprise that would be unnecessary if all personnel
were competent and trustworthy .
.
, measures to remind per-
sonnel ... of their duties, to encourage efficiency, prudence,
loyalty, and to provide for timely discovery of errors ...
Internal (accounting) control is recognized as part of
the total management control system -- measures employed by
management to obtain the objectives of the enterprise. It
constitutes an identifiable subset of these measures. At
the same time, the proposed definition does not encompass any
part of policy formation (strategic planning) or operational
planning (operational control)
.
Finally, Mautz and White state that although it is separate
from policy formation and operational planning, internal
(accounting) control leans heavily on these elements of
management control for meaning. It could not be evaluated
effectively all by itself. Unless policy goals in the form of
reasonably specific objectives are known, there can be no
measures to attain them. Unless operating plans exist,
supervision of performance loses its meaning. Internal
accounting reports must recognize that both objectives and
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plans to achieve them (internal administrative controls) are
highly relevant to the purpose of reporting, and from a
management viewpoint, one aspect of external reporting is to
show how well the company has met its objectives.
C. DOD'S PLANNING, PROGRAMMING , BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPBS)
The Department of Defense (DOD) utilizes a similar system
of planning and control based on Anthony's framework. The
system is grounded upon an assessment of strategic goals and
requirements and the quantification of these requirements into
budgetary vehicles, following much the same process as des-
cribed in Anthony's management control process presented in
Chapter III. Summarized, this Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System (PPBS) is based on the anticipated threat; a
strategy is developed to counter the threat; requirements of
the strategy are then estimated; programs are developed to
package and execute the strategy; and finally, the costs of
approved programs are budgeted.
1 . Planning and Programming
The concept of planning within the DOD is meant to
fulfill the same role as strategic planning in Anthony's
framework. Much as a corporate Board of Directors sets the
broad goals and objectives of the corporation, goals and
requirements of the DOD are set by high level bodies, such as
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council,
and the Secretary of Defense, which analyze the threat to the
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national defense under varying scenarios. These threat
analyses are viewed over long timeframes (10 years or more)
considering numerous factors and are published in the Joint
Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) . From the JSPD, the
Secretary of Defense, as the Chief Executive Officer of the
DOD, issues his Defense Guidance, which translates the threat
requirements into guidance for preparation of the Program
Objectives Memoranda (POM)
.
The basic purpose of the programming phase of the
PPBS is to translate the strategy into the program force
structures in terms of time-phased resource requirements,
including personnel, funding, and material. Most of the
emphasis within the DOD and the Services is devoted to develop-
ment of the weapons systems determined as required to meet
the threat, rather than analysis of the threat itself. Fur-
ther, as the "threat" or "strategy" is less than a quanti-
fiable set of terms, and as the threat is described over a
long-term future basis, there is really no firm method to
evaluate the developed threats in retrospect. Hence,
comparatively little emphasis is placed on the planning phase.
This has resulted in the phrase "Planning, the silent 'P 1
in PPBS."
The POM expresses the total requirements of each of
the Services in terms of force structure, manpower, material
and costs, to satisfy all assigned functions and responsibil-
ities during the period of the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP)
99

These requirements are expressed in terms of specific programs
within the FYDP , and each of the programs is assigned a
specific numerical code, the Program Element Number (PEN).
The PEN becomes a vehicle by which the programs may be tracked
from the development cycle through execution.
Each of the Services submits its POM to the Secretary
of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and
eventual approval. The Secretary's review/approval is in the
form of Program Decision Memoranda (PDM) , which direct the
respective service to make an adjustment to a specific program
within its POM. The Service's POM, as adjusted by the various
PDMs, becomes the guidance to the Service for budget
development.
2. Budgeting
The ultimate purpose of the PPBS is to develop the
DOD input to the President's budget, which is submitted
annually to Congress in the January timeframe. The budgeting
phase, however, is more than a mere resubmission of the POM
as the budget to Congress is in appropriation format, while
the POM was in program format. This becomes a somewhat
difficult task as each program utilizes funds from various
appropriations, such as Military Personnel, Procurement
appropriations, and Operations and Maintenance. The PEN,
previously described, becomes a key element in crossing
programs to appropriations and back.
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Often overlooked in the management control require-
ments of the DOD is the time-phasing of budget development and
budget execution. Budget development, including the planning
and programming phases, is being accomplished at the Service
headquarters level a year in advance of the President's
budget submission to the Congress. Thus, requirements for
FY-85 will be submitted to the Congress in January, 1984.
These requirements were developed over the course of calendar
year 1983. However, budget execution is performed at the
activity level, but budget development emphasis at the activity
level is for the next fiscal year. That is, in the spring
and summer of 1983, the activities are critically evaluating
their budget requirements for FY-84. While most activities
are required to identify needed resources for FY-85 at the
same time, this effort is less than critical in the minds of
activity personnel; FY-84 is the most important.
Thus, while the PPBS has the wherewithal to be a
powerful management control system, the sheer magnitude of
the DOD and the long-term (2 years ahead) budgeting require-
ments, a break in the management control system exists
between the Headquarters levels and the activity levels.
3 . Budget Execution
Resources are allocated to activities based upon
their identified needs, and based upon the funding approp-
riated by the Congress. At this point, a further separation
of requirements occurs, as funds are passed along
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organizational lines. Previously we witnessed requirements
identified along program lines, converted to appropriation
lines, and now being segregated by activity lines. Save for
the program element number (PEN), tracking, for evaluation
and control purposes, from requirement in the POM to final
accounting of the funds, becomes tantamount to impossible.
It should be noted that during execution, costs are aggregated
by organization and by program in preparation for reports to
managers outside the immediate organization. There is
basically no structure for maintaining information useful to
managers in the continuing operation of their organization.
Large commands do maintain an internal audit staff
to ensure resources have been employed effectively and
efficiently and within legal and administrative constraints.
In the past, there has been little emphasis on preventive
administrative and accounting controls which would lessen
the need for the detective function of internal audit.
4 . Review and Evaluation
As the stated purpose of the PPBS is the submission
of the President's Budget, PPBS does not focus a great deal
of attention on the area of review and evaluation. Activi-
ties do attempt to avoid the hazards of RS 3678 and 3679
violations and financial, compliance, economy and efficiency,
and program audits are done on a relatively regular basis
by all levels of audit agencies. However, the institution-
alized coordination and control activities focus on meeting
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the requirements of outside managers, rather than the internal
needs of local managers; operational managers' performance
evaluations focus primarily on the level of attainment, of
mission objectives rather than on budgetary performance;
and programs are reviewed at very high levels with rare
involvement of personnel at the activity level. Thus, the
review and evaluation processes at the activity level are
more closely related to operational or internal accounting
controls than to management controls.
D. CONCLUSION
Both the private and public sector are capable of estab-
lishing a basic structure for the application of management
control. However, in reality, the public sector's execution
is so far removed from the long-range planning process and
the span of operations is so great that overall control is
next to impossible to attain. Therefore, form has tended to





Since an example is worth a thousand words, a number of
representative cases which illustrate the problems and risks
of accepting the narrow definition of internal accounting
control will be illustrated 1j this chapter. Some are drawn
from the private sector and others are from the public sector




This case [Ref. 45] relates the story of a man with
an established history of embezzlement in Canada and the
United States. Each previous instance had provided a learn-
ing experience for him.
The main story revolves around Wilby, alias A. D.
Hume, whom our man had met by placing a bogus classified
advertisement in a trade journal. When the real Hume de-
parted for military duty during World War II, Wilby took
his credentials to a New York employment agency which
specialized in CPA's. Despite the fact that the head of
the agency knew the real Hume slightly and realized the man
before him bore no resemblance to him the embezzler rose
above that and was sent on an interview. Hume's impressive
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credentials were verified and Wilby gained a new position
as an accountant with the William T. Knott Company, a
management corporation for a set of department stores which
ordered and received their own merchandise and forwarded the
invoices on to the parent company for payment.
The Knott Company averaged $40 million in disburse-
ments per year for which the company felt it had a foolproof
accounting system. Invoices were carefully compared with the
purchase orders. Accountants, clerks, typists, and standard
business machines took the approved invoices through a lab-
yrinth bookkeeping system at the end of which checks emerged
ready for signature by a check-signing machine prior to mailing
This machine was complicated and mechanically above reproach.
Only a few personnel had access to it and only after the
proper, secret perforations and notches had been made on
certain unmentionable pieces of cardboard — one for each
invoice — would the machine sign a vendor's check. When the
special machine was not working, important pieces of it were
locked up in different corners of the same accounting office.
Wilby progressively advanced in the company from
traveling accountant to home office accountant with no
defalcations. He was next named chief accountant at $6000
per year and was now in a position to make a fortune.
During the first year, Wilby took $110,936.81 which
wasn't missed by the company and was not revealed in the
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audit. During this timeframe, he was not above taking a
personal interest in the business machines, often dazzling
the operators by diagnosing their machine's difficulties after
a shrewd glance and some sympathetic fingering. At the end
of the year, he received a $500 bonus and was named assistant
treasurer.
During the next year, he took $275,984.43 and received
another year-end bonus.
Wilby and his wife lived modestly; he saved some of
his earnings and all he stole was conveniently available in
local New York banks.
As chief accountant, Wilby was tied to his position,
bringing office records home each evening to work on and tak-
ing business trips almost every weekend.
At the beginning of his third year in the position,
Wilby asked for a short vacation to take his wife skiing in
Canada. Since the previous year's accounts balanced and all
was under control, the request was granted.
When Wilby was due to return, the Knott Company
received a telegram stating that the man had broken his leg
and would be detained — no location was provided in the
message.
After unsuccessful efforts to find him, the company
realized its problem and called in the auditors. They dis-
covered that the withdrawals from the Knott account were
much higher than the total of the cancelled checks and that
a number of the cancelled checks were missing as well.
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The embezzler's scheme had been accomplished without
difficulty. When the daily mail arrived, it was easy to
intercept several envelopes, change the value and name on
the original invoices, add a second invoice which duplicated
the store's submission, and then adjust the control totals;
another approach was to insert bogus invoices for his own
vendors and use the secret pieces of cardboard to process
them through the standard business machines. Wilby had rented
office space where the checks were mailed for arrival on the
weekend. On his weekend business trips, he would make sure
to deposit them promptly in a local bank for later transfer
to the same bank branch that was used by the Knott Company in
New York.
When a Toledo bank checked the references of G. B.
Towle, one of the ficticious vendors, "Hume" assured it that
Towle was a legitimate businessman in the advertising line.
When D. True, an accountant at the Butte, Montana
store, raised questions about certain suspicious freight
charges debitted against the store, the Knott Company treas-
urer referred his inquiry to "Hume." In his written response,
the investigators found a clue as to how the scheme had
worked. By tracing the freight charge through the accounting
system, they discovered how the books balanced in spite of
the defalcations. The stolen money was charged to the depart-
ment store and deftly distributed among the stores in
different ways and with shrewd knowledge of which accounts
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could stand being raised a bit here and there so that the
stores wouldn't notice.
When the auditors did their yearly review of the books,
the embezzler had allowed them to add all the bank statements
and the cancelled checks, including the ones he had endorsed
himself, with the result that the withdrawals from the Knott
Company bank account tallied with the total of the cancelled
checks. Then he had destroyed the cancelled checks he had
endorsed and had altered entries in the books, so that, in
effect, what the Knott Company had lost to him it got back
from the stores, in the form of debits against the stores'
accounts. The investigators wondered why Wilby had departed
so suddenly since if he had followed through for the current
year, he would probably never have been discovered.
As a protective procedure, companies bond their
employees. Because the insurance company which had bonded
Wilby had a large investment in the case, he was pursued
diligently.
It was easy enough to find the real Major Hume and
realize he did not meet the description of the embezzler.
Old bank records revealed one of the few careless
mistakes of the imposter. When he had purchased a bank draft,
Wilby had originally requested that it be made out to his
real name . Then he had changed his mind and named Hume as




After finally apprehending Wilby, the Knott Company
was satisfied the embezzler had no human accomplices but the
standard business machines were criticized and newly devised
safeguards were added to them.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) proved to
be the reason why Wilby had left the firm so abruptly. At
the time this case was occurring, the mid-1940 's, the FBI
was investigating German names, specifically one F. B. Hecht,
who the agency was convinced was a Nazi Fifth Columnist.
Hecht had been one of Wilby 's ficticious vendors and the
local St. Louis bank provided "Hume's" name as a reference
to the agency. He provided them misleading information but
the agency continued to pursue the issue so Wilby did not
wait for the approaching showdown.
Although currently considered a statutory felony,
at the time of the Wilby case, embezzlement was not generally
considered a crime against the people and perpetrators were
often given suspended sentences or short prison terms if they
made restitution.
However, the judge in this case felt that if Wilby
was given a lenient sentence, he would be foolish if he
didn't continue to embezzle. So the judge sentenced him to
from five to seven years in Sing Sing and requested his
deportation at the completion of the prison term.
So much for the W. T. Knott Company's foolproof
system! A review of the factors that shaped the internal
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accounting control environment shows just how easy they were
to circumvent in this particular situation.
Wilby understood the processes of the accounting
system, the duties of its personnel, and the intricacies of
the standard business machines so well that he was able to
effectively manipulate all the peripheral clerical and
administrative procedures surrounding it. Even though the
books were in perfect balance when audited (reliable finan-
cial records) and the company did not notice any missing
funds (safeguarded assets) , the true picture indicated that
there was little operational effectiveness or efficiency
or little adherence to managerial policies (internal adminis-
trative controls) . And so in the final analysis the account-
ing controls were inoperative as well.
A more thorough investigation of Wilby 's credentials
should have been completed by the employment agency especially
since the director knew he was not dealing with the real
Hume.
The Knott Company was disarmed by the apparent out-
standing performance and charming personality of their wily
employee. The firm should have been a bit more aware of the
internal control mechanism of separation of duties; rather
than relying on the convenience of an in-house repairman,




Wilby was able to rise smoothly above the few ques-
tions that were raised. As stated in the original case
"... such strange things have happened that we cannot count
on anything."
This case demonstrates the value of personnel who
raise critical questions. It is a matter of judgment whether
to pursue such information but the Knott Company could have
benefitted if it had not placed such faith in its employee.
2. Rockwell International Corporation
Rockwell expected to save a lot of money by leasing
computers from third parties rather than buying or renting
them from manufacturers.
Instead the company became a victim in the computer-
leasing fraud carried out by OPM Leasing Services, Inc.
A recent court-ordered investigation has revealed
that poor financial and management controls made the company
an easy mark.
The practices which facilitated the fraud included
the following:
Rockwell's lawyer in charge of computer leasing
allowed his secretary to keep a stack of pre-signed
legal opinions that sometimes were attached to un-
read leases ... Rockwell officials also didn't
attend lease closings and thus wouldn't be able to
notice when documents had been doctored or switched.
Bad record-keeping hurt the company too. Officials
often didn't keep track of lease documents, make
copies, or note when papers were missing. Thus
Rockwell had no way to determine whether computers
listed on a particular lease presented by OPM for
execution had already appeared on a prior lease
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which happened in some cases. That allowed the
swindlers to fraudulently secure bank loans for
equipment never bought or delivered to Rockwell.
Leases often specified payments were to be sent
directly to the banks that had financed the computers.
Instead, Rockwell often paid OPM with the belief the
money would be forwarded to the bank. 0PM, however,
frequently missed the payments. Disregarding direct
payment obligations facilitated the fraud and dero-
gated the legal rights of the financing institutions.
— Rockwell apparently suspected that management of its
computer leasing wasn't as tight as it could be.
Internal audits in 1979 and 1980 concluded too much
responsibility was concentrated in the hands of the
director of computer planning and his role was re-
duced but he continued to help OPM land most of the
computer leasing contracts despite Rockwell's growing
reservations about OPM's honesty and financial
soundness
.
Rockwell's chief financial officer ordered an examina-
tion of OPM's financial statements to determine the
company's soundness. Mr. Goodman of OPM gave Rockwell's
treasurer a bogus financial statement. He testified
that Rockwell's director of computer planning had told
him not to worry about the financial review since the
treasurer ' ... doesn't understand financial state-
ments anyway, so you can double talk your way around
it. And you should have no problem. ' This was an
accurate prediction since the treasurer did not
notice the absence of a date on the auditor's report
or the inadvertent inclusion of cash and marketable
securities in the receivables subtotal. He focused on
net worth, finding the grossly inflated $44.9 million
figure satisfactory.
— Rockwell officials learned in 1980 that the OPM
swindlers had pleaded guilty to check kiting charges
in a separate matter but the company continued to
conduct business with OPM until 1981.
Rockwell has denied that its management, record-
keeping or financial controls contributed significantly to
the fraud but the company has agreed to adopt new leasing
rules requiring: top officials to approve all third-party
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leases; the company to keep lease documents and copies in
a central filing system and make lease payments only to the
people who are supposed to be paid; company lawyers give an
opinion about proposed lease contracts and be present when
they are signed. [Ref. 46]
It is clear that failure to follow established poli-
cies and guidelines, inattention to detail and ineffective
management oversight greatly contributed to this fraud. Such
concerns are related to internal administrative controls but
have the potential to generate large financial losses.
Better management controls in the following areas
could have prevented this fiasco: a more careful selection
of qualified and trustworthy personnel, more formal legal
procedures, more rigid recordkeeping, and tighter financial
administrative controls.
The narrow range of internal accounting controls
fails to recognize the importance of such concerns as adher-
ence to management policies or operational effectiveness or
efficiency. This case illustrates the tremendous losses,
estimated at $600 million which can be suffered by a company
which fails to focus enough attention on the enforcement of
internal administrative controls.
3. General Dynamics
A federal grand jury indicted two former General
Dynamics executives for receiving kickbacks in connection
113

with construction of liquified natural gas (LNG) tankers and
Navy nuclear submarines. The two named in the indictment
were P. Takis Veliotis and James H. Gilliland.
The indictment states the kickbacks were arranged
through Frigitemp Corporation, a General Dynamics subcontractor
which provided interior fixtures and insulation for ships.
Frigitemp was declared bankrupt in 1979 but its subcontracts
were transferred to another company so the scheme could
continue. A vice president and the chairman and chief execu-
tive officer of the subcontractor were also indicted for
arranging and making the kickback payments.
The kickback scheme began in 1973 and 1974 when
Frigitemp realized that kickbacks to Veliotis and Gilliland
would ensure winning the subcontracts. As ten of the LNG
tankers were built, Frigitemp received more than $44 million
in subcontracts. The awards were made: in one instance even
though the shipyard's purchasing department had recommended
a previous bidder; in another instance, even though the time
specified for the receipt of bids hadn't expired.
Funds for the scheme were generated by having Frigi-
temp pay for non-existent consulting services and raw
materials. These costs were passed on to the prime contractor
who in turn passed some of them on to the federal government.
When subcontracts were awarded to Frigitemp for two
of the tankers, shipyard employees protested that the bids
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submitted by the subcontractor were far in excess of competing
bids. [Ref. 47]
Despite the facts that: adequate procedures were
established in the area of contract administration; shipyard
employees protested the awards, and the Navy questioned cost
overruns, management was able to render the controls
ineffective. This case illustrates the limitations of inter-
nal controls when management colludes and overrides them.
It also shows the value of fostering a critical attitude
among employees so that they may bring concerns to management's
attention.
4. Touche Ross
A Wall Street Journal article [Ref. 48] states that
the SEC recently charged one of the "Big Eight" auditing
firms with failure to examine the company's financial state-
ment in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
The surface shipyard signed contracts worth $3
billion to build destroyers and helicopter carriers for the
Navy. For several reasons, including blunders in production,
the contractor's expenses began ballooning. Rather than
recording the burgeoning expenses as losses when incurred,
the company deferred them in the hopes that the Navy would
pay the extra bills.
The SEC said that the auditing firm should not have
acquiesced to the contractor's deferral of the losses.
Although the auditor had issued qualified opinions subject
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to uncertainties over the dispute, the SEC stated that the
auditing firm should have known that the contractor was
unlikely to escape without losses and therefore, should have
recommended that the company recognize at least some of the
losses earlier. Further, the SEC felt that the auditor should
have challenged management about the contract losses.
The contract dispute ended in 1973 with the company
accepting a $200 million loss on Navy work.
Although this article primarily addresses the fair-
ness of the presentation of financial statements and thus
is closely tied to internal accounting controls, it also
indicates that management's failure to deal with problems
in program or operational areas can quickly be translated
into financial ones. Even if controls as established are
adequate, failure to follow them negates their value.
This particular case also raises concerns about
the apparent willingness of audit firms to accept manage-
ment's views without maintaining a healthy skepticism or
exercising the professional judgment gained through numerous
audits.
5. Itel
Another Wall Street Journal article [Ref . 49] dis-
cusses a court-ordered examiner's report that asserted Itel's
collapse was caused by decisions of top management and the




'There was substantial failures by the company's
management and legal counsel to make full disclosures of
significant facts and developments 1 and the auditing firm
'breached its contractural duties to perform an adequate
audit' and to inform the company's directors of the serious-
ness of its weaknesses of internal controls.
The central cause of these breaches was the dominant
management style of the company's president who believed that
controls would 'stifle entrepreneurship' and threaten the
'ambience' of the company.
As a result, the company's management style and
attitudes, weak internal controls, major business problems,
and heavy debt combined to force the corporation's financial
collapse in 1979.
The report said that its 'criticism of outside
directors related not to improper actions but to their lack
of actions. They did not conduct the kind of oversight
function one might have expected.'
Finally, the report stated that the 1978 and 1979
financial statements 'contained materially false and mis-
leading information.'
This case illustrates what can happen when manage-
ment control and internal accounting and administrative
controls are not enforced or are nonexistent.
The last two cases dealing with the private sector




6 . Penn Central Transportation Company (PCTC)
One of the largest mergers in industrial history (in
terms of assets) was the marriage of the Pennsylvania Railroad
and the New York Central Railroad in 1968. Two years later,
the combined entity became one of the largest bankrupt
organizations in history. Some of the reasons listed for the
collapse include a lack of flow forecasts, lack of a costing
system, creative accounting, lack of budgetary control, and
improper asset valuation. More specifically, management
incorrectly charged operating expenses to capital, allowed
the crediting of uncollectibles to income, recognized gains
on the transfer of assets from one subsidiary to another, and
made loans to subsidiaries and then recorded the cash flow-
ing back to the parent company as dividends. One analyst
commented that these practices turned a $95 million actual
loss in 1969 into a reported profit before extraordinary
items of $4.4 million. Such practices are intentional per-
petrations by management and it is doubtful that any internal
control system could have prevented them.
However, other unintentional deficiencies in internal
control appear to have contributed to the collapse. Evidently,
PCTC operated filthy trains on rails in serious disrepair.
Service was very poor with trains often missing scheduled
arrivals. Apparently, an employee and management performance
evaluation system was not in place to prevent such poor
business practices and supervision. These matters related
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to operational efficiency and managerial policies, administra-
tive concerns overlooked by the narrow definition of internal
control. In addition to lack of management communication
flowing down into the organization, an inadequate management
information system prevented proper information from flowing
up to management. Just prior to collapse, the Department of
Transportation requested a cash flow forecast in response
to the company's bail-out request to the federal government.
However, no such forecast was forthcoming due to the inadequate
records. Ironically, 17 members of the board of directors
were bankers. On June 21, 1968, PCTC ran out of cash and
filed for bankruptcy.
Although internal controls might not have prevented
management's manipulation of accounting policies, they might
well have prevented cash insolvency. Preparation of a state-
ment of sources and uses of cash for 1962-67 would have
shown:
SOURCES AND USES OF CASH
(in million $)
Sources:
Rail Income $ 38








Decrease in Cash $1120
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It appears that periodic preparation and review of
cash flow forecasts would have highlighted the significant
cash outflow and future cash shortage. Also, it would appear
that the board of directors did not inquire into the cash
flow situation until it was too late. Since such information
plays a vital role in the safeguarding of assets (especially
cash) , it qualifies as an element of internal accounting
control. In the case of PCTC , this element was seriously
lacking.
7. W. T. Grant
Unlike the bankruptcy of Penn Central, the public
was not surprised by the failure of W. T. Grant. The finan-
cial papers regularly printed stories concerning this
retailer's financial woes during the year prior to bankruptcy
The 1973-74 recession served to accelerate the company's
decline and brought about its financial death in 1975.
Analysts have cited these reasons for failure: an
overly aggressive expansion program (612 new stores between
1963 and 1973) , lack of uniformity among stores, lack of
management skill and merchandising focus, excess inventory
due to a wide product line, and a switch to a cash draining
revolving customer credit program. To fund the expansion
program, management raised debt inflating the company's
debt/equity ratio to .7 in 1972 Cone of the highest ratios
of any major merchandiser) . Additionally, the company paid
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out dividends on common stock in fiscal 1973 and 1974 equal
to 128% of the earnings available to common stockholders.
The high interest rates and credit crunch of 1974, combined
with the cash strains inflicted by management, were suf-
ficient to squeeze the last drops of liquidity out of the
company. Other signs of failure existed long before the
insolvency. Sales per square foot ranged between $32 and
$35, less than half of the rates obtained by Grant's
competitors. Poor store site locations were cited as a
contributing factor to the sales volume falling below those
of competitors. Between 1968 and 1972 Grant's sales increased
50% because of the numerous new stores opened but earnings
remained flat.
The Grant's failure does not appear to be primarily
due to weak internal accounting controls (as narrowly defined)
but to weak administrative controls. A close monitoring and
forecasting of cash flow and policies to retain cash would
have helped maintain Grant's liquidity. Consistent with
steps to protect liquidity, slower growth and efforts to
increase the profitability of existing stores. Such considera-
tions are not encompassed by the narrow definition of inter-
nal control yet are basic to the interests of investors,
creditors, and employees, suppliers, and others who must
suffer the consequences from such a significant bankruptcy.
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Although the W. T. Grant's litigation is not yet
completed, serious questions have been raised concerning the
adequacy of controls over accounts receivables and inventories
When compared to the control systems used by other large
retailers, the internal controls for Grant's receivables and
inventories were deficient. Also, the company had a very
small internal audit staff. These allegations of inadequate




The Defense Audit Service has provided examples of
adverse conditions due to weaknesses in internal control.
This sample of cases will focus on administrative controls
primarily but will mention some illustrations which deal with
accounting controls as well. This approach is used to show
that within an organization the controls which encourage
operational effectiveness and efficiency and the adherence
to managerial policies and procedures provide a framework
within which to integrate internal accounting controls.
2. Separation of Duties
The lack of separation of duties resulted in the
embezzlement of almost $2 million over a 3-year period from
the DOD Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed
Services (CHAMPUS) . The program pays non-Government
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hospitals and doctors for the medical care of eligible
military personnel and their dependents. Because of poor
internal controls, a civilian program administrator was
allegedly able to embezzle funds by preparing and certifying
over 3,300 phony medical claims. The administrator was





Imprest funds were often exposed to the risk of loss,
theft or misuse because not all agencies were adequately
controlling, safeguarding or managing millions of dollars in
such funds. One fiscal office that was not following GAO
and Treasury requirements to safeguard funds lost about
$209,000. The office kept its imprest funds in an unlocked
cashbox stored in a safe which was accessible to several
people other than the cashier.
4 Segregation of Duties Involving Government Transporta-
tion Requests (GTRs)
In many locations GTRs were susceptible to conversion
for personal use because of inadequate safeguards and
controls. These documents are issued to Federal employees
to be used in place of cash to pay for travel on official
business. Over a 2-year period, an employee at one location
converted several GTRs, amounting to more than $30,000, for
personal use. He was able to do this because he had total
control over acquiring, maintaining, issuing and accounting





Payroll preparation, processing, distribution and
related activities are common areas of fraud, waste and abuse
False statements on time and attendance documents are a
most frequent problem. In one case, a Government employee
was responsible for maintaining time and leave records and
sending the information to the agency's central payroll
office. The individual added fraudulent overtime hours to
her own payroll data before sending it to the payroll office.
This same individual distributed the payroll checks. The
fraud was detected because the timekeeper was absent on a
day when the payroll checks were received for distribution.
Her supervisor distributed the checks and noticed the time-
keeper was receiving excess pay. The individual received
$3,200 in fraudulent overpayments before being caught.
6 Personnel Control
False statements on employment applications are the
most frequently encountered problem. For example, several
DOD cases involved the fraudulent enlistment of illegal
aliens into a military service. The aliens enlisted by
presenting false birth certificates or other false proof
of U.S. citizenship. In another case, a recruiter, under
pressure to fill his quota of enlistments, allegedly en-




Control of Foreign Military Sales
Unfunded civilian personnel retirement costs were
not billed to FMS overhaul and repair cases because the repair
facilities performing the overhaul were not including a charge
for unfunded civilian retirement. This situation occurred
because implementing instructions had not been issued to
repair facilities requiring the inclusion of 13.4 percent
for unfunded civilian retirement costs. At least $566,000




Control of Support Services
Office furniture was not accounted for and was subject
to theft or misuse. Records were not maintained to identify
the quantity or the condition of furniture turned in for
storage. Documentation was not available to support furniture
disposals. After furniture was issued from the stock fund,
no further accountability was maintained.
9 Adequate Documents and Records
A naval air station found that a SERVMART was not
returning a copy of the SERVMART Shopping List (NAVSUP Form
1314) to the ordering unit/command, setting up the possibility
of the ordering of unauthorized/unnecessary items/quantities
of material.
10. Authorization Procedures
A naval air station found a lack of internal control
over the receipt, issue, and recording of small arms
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ammunition being passed from ordnance personnel to activity
units. 73,000 rounds were determined to have been issued to
personnel who were either not authorized to requisition the
ammunition, or not authorized to receipt for or pick up
ammunition. Also there was no separation of duties for
receipt, issue, and record maintenance functions performed
by ordnance personnel.
D. CONCLUSION
In assessing these cases which span approximately forty
years, consideration should be given to what has been
learned.
In the 1940 's, Wily Wilby effectively manipulated the
"foolproof" accounting system of the Knott Company because
of the company's lax administrative and clerical procedures.
Despite the fact that business firms and governmental
agencies have institutionalized the audit function, both
internal and external, and recently passed legislation has
attempted to ensure the establishment of adequate systems
of internal accounting control in both the private and public
sectors, current examples indicate that such a narrow em-
phasis does not ensure a well-managed (controlled) business
or necessarily lead to attaining the goals of safeguarded
assets and reliable accurate accounting records.
Management should focus, instead, on the intertwined
administrative and accounting controls which together lead
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to effectively and efficiently attaining program and opera-
tional objectives, as well as financial and administrative
ones
.
Yet, the picture presented is not quite so bleak. A
final private sector case is presented illustrating a
recognized system of internal control. It should be kept
in mind that this example focuses on the commercial sector's
performance measures of profit and loss and that each
organization is unique and its internal controls must be
adapted to that situation. Even so, much can be learned
from this presentation.
1 . International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT)
This discussion will center on the sections of a case
[Ref. 51] which deals with the establishment and operation of
ITT ' s Business Plan. The reader should keep in mind DOD '
s
PPBS budget process as well as Anthony's Management Control
framework as he or she proceeds
.
ITT attributes much of its success to an extensive
system of financial reports it uses to control its operating
units. The system measures progress in the conventional
sense of sales, earnings and return on investment and forces
operating personnel to focus their attention on critical
areas and to think beyond the problems at hand to longer
range objectives and strategy.
The annual Business Plan, the primary document of
the reporting and control system is extremely comprehensive.
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It is used as the primary standard for evaluating the perform-
ance of unit managers.
Each January, the regional headquarters sets tentative
objectives for the following two years for each of its operat-
ing units. This 'first look' is an attempt to provide a
broad statement of objectives permitting the operating units
to develop their own detailed Business Plans. Objectives are
established for both the unit as a whole and for each sep-
arate product line.
For each of the many product lines, objectives are






From January to April, these tentative objectives
are 'negotiated' between the regional headquarters and the
operating managers.
During May, the negotiated objectives are reviewed
and approved by the regional and corporate headquarters.
These final reviews focus primarily on the five key measures
noted above.
In June and July, the unit prepares its Business
Plan, describing in detail how the subsidiary intends to
achieve its approved objectives for the following two years.
The Business Plan is broad in scope, beginning with




Preceding year (actual date)
Current year (budget)
Next year (forecast)
Two years hence (forecast)
Five years hence (forecast)
This summary contains information dealing with the








Plant, property and equipment
Capital expenditures
Provision for depreciation
% return on sales
% return on total assets
% return on total capital employed
% total asset to sales
% receivables to sales
% inventories to sales
Orders received
Orders on hand
Average number of full-time employees
Total cost of employee compensation
Sales per employee
Net income per employee
Sales per $1000 of employee compensation
Net income per $10 00 of employee compensation
Sales per thousand square feet of floor space
Net income per thousand square feet of floor space
Expected changes in net income for the current year




This analysis forces operating managers to appraise the profit
implications of all management actions affecting prices,
costs, volume or product mix carefully.
These condensed reports are followed by a complete
set of projected financial statements for the current year
and for each of the next two years, with supporting detail
provided for major items on the statements.
The Business Plan contains a description of the
major management actions planned for the next two years with
an estimate of the favorable or unfavorable effect of each
one in monetary terms.
Separate plans are presented for each of the func-
tional areas: marketing, manufacturing, research and
development, financial control, and personnel and employee
relations. These plans state the function's mission, an
analysis of its present problems and opportunities, and a
list of specific actions projected for the next two years.
The Business Plan closes with a series of compara-
tive financial statements which depict the item-by-item
effect if sales fall to 60% or to 80% of forecast or increase
to 120% of forecast. For each of these levels of possible
sales, costs are divided into three categories: fixed costs,
unavoidable variable costs, and management discretionary
costs. Management describes the specific actions it will
take to control employment, total assets, and capital
expenditures in case of a reduction in sales and also
indicates when these actions would be put into effect.
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By mid-summer the completed Business Plan is sub-
mitted to company headquarters and in the early fall meetings
are held at the regional headquarters to review each unit's
Business Plan. At these sessions, top management often
proposes changes before final approval of a unit's individual
plan.
The approved plan forms the foundation of the follow-
ing year's budget. The budget's general design follows the
Business Plan's format except that the various dollar amounts
are broken down by months.
Every unit submits standard periodic reports to the
regional headquarters on a fixed schedule. Then computer
processing facilitates combining the results regionally and
for the entire corporation.
The main focus in the reports is on the variance
between actual results and budgeted results. Data are pre-
sented for both the latest month and for the year to date.
Differences between the current year and the prior year are
also reported.
Thirteen different reports are submitted by the unit
Controller on a monthly basis including:




Statement of changes in retained earnings
Statement of cash flow
Employment statistics
Status of orders received, cancelled and outstanding
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Statement of intercompany transactions
Statement of transactions with headquarters
Analysis of inventories
Analysisis of receivables
Status of capital projects (due last day of each month)
Controller's monthly operating and financial review
(20 or more pages)
The final item contains an explanation of the signif-
icant variances from budget, as well as a general commentary
on the financial affairs of the unit.
In addition, twelve other reports are required, either
quarterly, semi-annually, or annually.
A unit's periodic financial reports are reviewed by
a financial analyst. This review focuses on a comparison of
performance against budget for the five key measures — sales,
net income, total assets, total employees, and capital
expenditures. Trouble spots or developing trends are detected
The written portions of the reports are also carefully
reviewed.
Although revisions of the forecasts are permitted,
if the planned objectives are not met the situation is con-
sidered serious.
Guidance is available from specialists or the product-
line managers for unit managers who request help with their
operations.
Although the comprehensive reporting and control
system makes it appear that ITT is a highly centralized
organization, the managements of the various operating units
actually have considerable autonomy.
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As can be seen, the Business Plan of ITT has a number
of similarities to, and a few differences from, the PPBS cycle
used in DOD
.
A similar structure and process is followed. The
private company's regional and corporate headquarters can be
compared to DON's major claimant and Washington headquarters
staffs. In both systems, objectives are set after a period
of negotiations. Each organization establishes budgets for
individual units, as well as functional programs. Each
organization requires justification for funding requests and
each budget goes through an elaborate approval process. The
Business Plan serves as the basis for a unit's budget; the
POM provides a basis for the military budget. Both sectors
have a reporting system, but the one presented in the case
is more extensive. In both situations, the budgeting sys-
tem implies a highly centralized organization but in fact,
most of the individual units are quite autonomous.
Differences between these two systems include: The
PPBS system must work through many more layers -- the
President, Congress, DOD, Navy, and finally the individual
activity — and in a political atmosphere, making control
more complicated; the military does not use the budget as
the primary standard for evaluating the performance of its
managers, but focuses, instead, on the level of mission/
program attainment — a subjective measure; the military
budget is more amenable to adjustment than a unit's Business
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Plan; the military service does not plan as carefully for
under-or over-budget possibilities; nor does the military
budget address management plans.
Some of these differences could be adapted for federal
government use.
ITT's Business Plan presents a concrete example
demonstrating a Planning (what is to be done) and Control
system (how it is to be done) . Elements of strategic plan-
ning, management control, and operational control can be
found in the design. And it is clear that money is the
common denominator among the heterogeneous inputs and outputs
of the individual units.
The focus is on management control. The management
accounting information that is gathered provides management
data which assures managers that resources obtained are used
effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the
unit's objectives.
When performance is reviewed, a comparison is made
of budget figures with actual figures but the written por-
tions (nonquantifiable and nonmonetary data) of the reports
are also carefully reviewed. Thus, rigid conformance to plan
is not the only standard of measurement since within the
management control system, administrative and accounting
information are both considered.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The definition/ objectives, and concepts of internal con-
trol in common use today reflect the specialized needs of the
independent auditor.
There is little material adapting the existing writings to
the broader needs of managers who require a focus on all sys-
tems, not just those which provide financial information.
This section will discuss some pertinent comments of the
Special Advisory Committee on Internal Accounting Control that
are directed to private sector managers' concerns but are
equally applicable to the public sector; then specific con-
siderations and recommendations for the public sector will be




As the Special Advisory Committee on Internal Accounting
Control commented in 1979:
Management is necessarily concerned about all of the con-
trols contemplated in the 1949 definition of 'internal
control' ... controls that help to promote efficient and
effective operations have been, and will continue to be,
of vital importance to management. Also ... administra-
tive controls may have a bearing on the selection and
effectiveness of an (organization's) accounting control
procedures and techniques . . . administrative and operating
procedures focusing upon specific business activities often
complement accounting control procedures ... as business
transactions and the procedures necessary to execute them
become more complex, the difficulty of distinguishing be-




Thus managements' interests go beyond the confines of the
narrow legal interpretation of the FCPA or the FMFIA to
include all controls. As Grady stated in 1957 "... there
are many endeavors wherein a broader concept of responsibility
results in a lesser risk ..." Since his statement was made,
events in both private and public sectors have demonstrated
the shortcomings of the narrow application of internal account-
ing controls.
A further comment of the Special Advisory Committee which
is equally adaptable to private and public organizations states
The wide range in the size of these (organizations) , in
their operating styles, in the complexity of their trans-
actions, in the diversity of their products (programs) and
services, and in the geographical dispersion of their
operations clearly makes it impossible to enumerate specific
controls that will answer the needs of all (organizations)
.
[Ref. 53]
Thus, since internal control must be situation specific,
it has created difficulty in the public sector in the coor-
dination and summarization of reports and certifications
throughout organization structures. Similar potential prob-
lems exist in the corporate environment as well, but private
sector managers are not currently required to report on the
state of their internal control in quite as comprehensive a
manner as public sector executives do.
Other statements of the Report require consideration by
the spectrum of managers:
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Control procedures and techniques have evolved . .
.
based on the judgments of individual managements of
their necessity and usefulness in specific
circumstances
.
Subjective knowledge, experience, specific industry
(programs) and business conditions, management style,
cost-benefit judgments . . . affect the selection of
appropriate control procedures and techniques . .
.
there is a necessary element of subjectivity inherent
in an evaluation by management of internal ... control.
... there is not sufficient empirical knowledge of how
extensively control procedures and techniques are em-
ployed ... the lack of knowledge of what (is) neces-
sary for purposes of effective internal . . . control
further complicates the task of evaluation.
(organization) do not have a comprehensive theoretical
model to use in making informed, supportable judgments
on the cost-benefit decisions implicit in developing
their ... procedures and techniques. [Ref. 54]
These comments restate the themes that internal control is
situation specific and that subjective knowledge and profes-
sional judgment are required in the establishment and mainten-
ance of a proper system.
C. PUBLIC SECTOR CONSIDERATIONS
The following comments are presented specifically for public
sector managers 1 consideration:
That the agencies directing the implementation of the
internal control program within the federal government
will recognize the value of emphasizing a management
control framework which promotes the accomplishment of
organizational goals and objectives; and within which
administrative controls promote program and operational
effectiveness and efficiency and support managerial
policies, and accounting controls safeguard assets and
provide accurate, reliable financial data.
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The support of senior line managers is critical and
should be gained with the focus described above since
this broader concept is the only meaningful way in
which internal control can be related to such managers'
responsibilities and interests in accomplishing the
goals and objectives of the organization. A narrow
focus on internal accounting control, aiming to avoid
legal problems, will not encompass these managers'
wider concerns
.
Once this broader focus is cemented, training courses
should be established which support this direction
and give a more refined set of guidelines for the
establishment and review of internal control systems
than are currently available. The Arthur Anderson &
Company approach mentioned previously should be a
useful beginning because of the inclusive nature of
their program.
More research into the state of the art concerning
systems of internal control with an emphasis on the
concerns of managers is needed. Lessons learned could
be presented in case study format so that organiza-
tions could easily adapt useful ideas to their unique
situations. These same case studies could be useful
in the aforementioned training courses.
Since most control measures are based in large part
on the fact that human beings make mistakes and often
do not react to problems by undertaking adequate and
prompt corrective action, the more qualified employees
are, the more they will perceive deviations from plans
and take timely action to prevent them. The most
direct form of all control is to take steps to ensure
the high quality of employees, commensurate with their
responsibilities and at reasonable cost.
A large measure of professional judgment is required
to maintain and evaluate a dynamic internal control
system.
Some thought should be given to the documentation of
internal controls in common management/administrative
areas by the cognizant organizations to avoid the





It is recognized that the internal control concept is in
a state of transition in the public sector. Even as organiza-
tions struggle to establish systems based on the broad
definition, OMB and DOD are narrowing the scope to internal
accounting control to meet the FMFIA objectives. This shift
can only add to the confusion of implementing a little under-
stood program. However, this narrowing does make it easier
to assess internal control by looking at information that is
readily quantifiable and innovative approaches, such as the
Burns System, can be useful here. Such an approach fails to
consider management's broader range of responsibility for
accomplishing its programs and operational activities ef-
ficiently and effectively within prescribed policies, as well
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